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1 Introduction 
It has become clear in the last couple of decades that in order to address real policy 
questions, we must employ economic models that are both stochastic and dynamic. These 
models lead naturally to infinite dimensional commodity spaces. The future is uncertain, 
and infinitely many resolutions of this uncertainty are conceivable. There is no natural 
terminal period, so time horizons must be open ended. In this survey, we discuss the 
problems of working with infinite dimensionai spaces in connection with the existence 
and efficiency of Walrasian equilibria in the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie framework. To 
simplify the exposition, we primarily consider pure exchange economies. 
The main technical difficulties stem from the following considerations. On a finite 
dimensional commodity space there is only one natural linear topology, namely the Eu­
clidean topology. In the Euclidean topology every linear functional is continuous. Con­
sequently there is only one natural price space, and it looks just like the commodity 
space. Furthermore, the value of a commodity vector is a jointly continuous function 
of the commodity vector and the price vector. On an infinite dimensional commodity 
space, there is generally more than one natural topology, and the topological dual, the 
set of continuous linear functionals, depends on the topology. Many of these topologies, 
especially the useful ones, are not described by metrics. The dual space may not have 
an interpretation in terms of prices of individual commodities. Furthermore, the value 
of a commodity vector is not necessarily a jointly continuous function of the price and 
commodity vectors. 
In finite dimensional Euclidean spaces, every closed and bounded set is compact, 
so continuous functions a:nd preferences have greatest .elements. In infinite dimensional 
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spaces, closed and bounded sets need not be compact, and compact sets are rather hard 
to come by. The choice of topology determines the number of compact sets, but the 
tradeoff is generally that any topology that admits a lot of compact sets admits very few 
continuous functions. 
In finite dimensional spaces, disjoint nonempty convex sets can always be separated 
by a hyperplane. In infinite dimensional spaces this is not true. Either one of the sets 
needs to have a nonempty interior, or both must be closed with one compact. While 
nonempty interiors may seem natural in the finite dimensional case, in many of the 
topologies economists use, the set of positive vectors for.instance _may, have an empty 
interior. 
Finally, in the finite dimensional case, monotonicity of preferences with respect to the 
natural order structure of the commodity space pl_ays a marginal role. This assumption 
can easily be replaced by local nonsatiation conditions and conditions on asymptotic 
cones of consumption and production sets. In the infinite dimensional case, the order 
structure plays an important role. In particular, the natural order structure on the price 
space appears at this time to be crucial. 
There are four broad approaches that characterize most proofs of the existence of 
Walrasian equilibrium in the case of a finite dimensional commodity space. The first and 
perhaps most natural is the supply and demand approach. This approach shows that 
an equilibrium (more accurately a quasiequilibrium) exists by showing that the process 
of raising the price of commodities with excess demand and lowering the price of those 
in excess supply has a fixed point. That is, there is a price vector that requires no 
adjustments. Examples of this approach include [82, 83, 161 ,  163 , 169] .  The difficulties 
of generalizing this approach to infinite dimensional spaces comes from the fact that 
budget sets are not generally compact, so that demand is not well defined. This can be 
remedied by looking at an increasing sequence of compact sets, finding a market clearing 
price for the "compactified" economy, and taking a limit of the prices. This works fine 
in the finite dimensional case, but in the infinite dimensional case, the sequence of prices 
may well converge to zero. There are ways however to adapt this approach to infinite 
dimensional settings, see for instance [97, 210] .  
A second approach might be  called the noncooperative generalized game theoretic 
approach. Consumers and producers are viewed as players in a game where there strategy 
space consists of commodity vectors that correspond to consumption or production plans. 
Unlike normal form games, the set of feasible strategies is not fixed, but depends on the 
strategy choices of other players . . A .fictitious player called .the auctioneer is introduced, 
whose strategy space is the price space. Consumers' payoffs are their utilities, producers' 
payoffs are their profits, and the auctioneer's payoff is the value of excess demand. This 
approach then uses a generalization of the existence theorem for Nash equilibrium to 
show the existence of Walrasian equilibrium. This approach has been especially useful 
for models where the consumers' preferences are intransitive. Examples of this approach 
include [27, 78, 104, 105 ,  193] . This approach has the same difficulties as the supply and 
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demand approach for infinite dimensional economies, but see, for instance [99, 220) . 
A third approach might be called the welfare based approach. It relies on the Pareto 
efficiency of Walrasian equilibria and the second welfare theorem. When there are m con­
sumers, the set of Pareto efficient allocations is homeomorphic to the m-1 simplex (74) . 
Given a Pareto efficient allocation, there is a price vector that supports the allocation. At 
that price vector consumer budgets may not balance, so the allocation is adjusted by low­
ering their utility level or welfare weight of consumers who are exceeding their budgets. 
Standard fixed point arguments show that this process has a fixed point. That is, there 
is an allocation that requires no adjustment to balance the budgets . .This approach was 
pioneered by Negishi [167) and adopted by Arrow and Hahn [28) and Mas-Colell [152) . 
Since all the adjustments take place in the m-1 simplex, the difficulties for the infinite 
dimensional case all revolve around the second welfare theorem. 
The fourth approach, which we might call the Edgeworth equilibrium approach , is a 
refinement of the welfare approach. It relies on the core convergence result that the core of 
a replica economy "shrinks" to the set of Walrasian equilibria. · Given that the core of an 
economy is nonempty and compact (in the finite dimensional world) ,  the intersection of 
the cores of the replica economies is also nonempty and compact. Debreu and Scarf [87) 
noted that this approach could be used to prove the existence of equilibrium. The 
nonemptiness theorem for the core is again a finite dimensional result, relying in fixed 
point theorems in the utility space JRm for m players. This approach is used in [5, 6, 9) . 
Not all proofs of the existence of equilibrium fall neatly into one of these categories, 
a notable exception being the insightful paper of D. Luenberger [138) . 
Here is a brief review of the organization and the material presented in this article. 
We start by presenting some fundamental concepts from the theory of Riesz spaces. 
Then we discuss preferences and utility functions and describe the characteristics of 
exchange economies. Subsequently, we discuss the notion of Pareto efficiency and the 
welfare theorems. Next, the notion of properness is introduced followed by a discussion 
of the validity of the welfare theorems in the presence of properness. The notion of 
a Walrasian equilibrium is discussed next followed by a complete investigation of the 
existence of Walrasian equilibria. In addition to the notion of a Walrasian equilibrium 
we introduce the core and Edgeworth equilibria and discuss in detail their relationships. 
As an application of the theory presented here, we formulate and prove the existence of 
a competitive equilibrium in the single agent growth model. 
2 Riesz spaces 
The natural framework for infinite dimensional commodity spaces seems to be Riesz 
spaces, so a few definitions are in order. (For a fuller exposition of these concepts see [2, 
10, 11 ] . )  A Riesz space is a vector space that is equipped with a partial order � that 
makes it a lattice. A partial order is a transitive, reflexive, and antisymmetric binary 
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relation. (We write x � y to mean y :::::; x, and x > y means x � y and x i= y.) For 
instance, the pointwise order on a space of functions is a partial order. A lattice is a 
set with a partial order having the property that each pair x, y has both a supremum 
(least upper bound) x Vy and an infimum (greatest lower bound) x /\ y. A vector x is 
positive if x � 0. The cone of positive vectors in a Riesz space E is denote E+ or E+ . 
The absolute value of a vector x in a Riesz space is defined by lxl = x V (-x) . A subset 
A of a Riesz space is solid if !x i :::::; jyj and y E A imply x E A. A Riesz subspace 
of a Riesz space E is a vector subspace that is closed under the lattice operations. A 
solid Riesz subspace of a Riesz space E is called an ideal in E. For z E E+ , then the 
principal ideal (or simply the ideal) Ez generated by z is the ·vector"subspace 
Ez = {x E E :  3 A >  0 such that jxj:::::; .Xz} . 
For example, the set C[O, 1] of continuous functions on the unit interval is a lattice un­
der the pointwise order. The supremum of f and g is given by fVg(x) = max{f(x) , g(x)} ,  
which is continuous. On the other hand, C1 (0, 1 ) ,  the vector space of continuously differ­
entiable functions on (0, 1) is not a lattice under the pointwise ordering. For instance, the 
pair of functions J(x) = x and g(x) = 1 - x has no least upper bound in C1 (0, 1 ) .  (There 
are plenty of upper bounds, but no continuously differentiable upper bound is smallest. 
The smallest continuous function that is pointwise as large as both is not differentiable, 
it has a kink at �.) 
A linear functional p: E -+  IR on a Riesz space E is positive if x � 0 implies p(x) � 0. 
The vector space consisting of the differences of all pairs of positive linear functionals is 
called the order dual of E and is denoted E "'. It turns out that the order dual E "'  is a 
Riesz space under the pointwise order. If p, q E E "', then p V q and p /\ q are given by 
p V q(x) = sup{p(y) + q(z) : y, z � 0 and y + z = x } ,  
and 
p /\ q(x) = inf{p(y) + q(z) : y, z � 0 and y + z = x} 
for each x � 0. 
In addition to the order structure, we also require a topological structure in order 
to carry out any economic analysis . A topology is a means for defining continuity and 
convergence. (See for instance [2] . ) A linear topology on a vector space is a topology 
for which vector addition and scalar multiplication are continuous functions. A typical 
(but no means the most useful) way to define a topology on a vector space is by means of 
a norm. A norm II · II is a real-valued function on a vector space satisfying: ( 1 )  llxll � 0 
for all x. (2) llxll = 0 implies x = 0. (3) llx + Yll :::::; llxll + llYll · A lattice norm on a 
Riesz space is a norm such that lxl :::::; IYI implies llxll :::::; llYll) . (A norm II · II defines a 
topology through the metric d defined by d(x, y) = llx - yll . ) 
As a matter of fact the most commonly employed vector spaces in economics are· 
all either Banach lattices or topological Riesz spaces. A Banach lattice is a Riesz 
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space which is a Banach space under a lattice norm. A topological Riesz space is a 
Riesz space equipped with a linear topology which is also locally solid, that is, it has a 
neighborhood base at zero consisting of solid sets. 
A dual pair a pair (X, X') of vector spaces and an associated bilinear functional 
( ·, ·) : X x X' -+ JR that separates points, called the duality of the pair. Thus X 
can be regarded as a vector space of linear functionals on X', and vice versa, via the 
relation x (x') = (x, x') = x' (x) . A topology 7 on X is consistent with the dual pair 
if every functional in X' is r-continuous. Likewise, a topology r' on X' is consistent 
if every functional in X is r'-continuous. Given a dual pair, the weak topology on 
X, a(X, X') , is the weakest consistent topology on X. The weak* topology on X', 
a(X', X) ,  is the weakest consistent topology on X'. The Mackey-Arens Theorem [2, 
Theorem 4 .86] asserts that there is also strongest consistent topology on X, called the 
Mackey topology, denoted r(X, X') . See [2, Sections 4.13-4.17] for a fuller explanation 
of dual pairs. 
We employ two kinds of dual pairs closely associated with lattice properties-Riesz 
pairs and lattice pairs. A Riesz pair (E, E') is a dual pair with the property that E 
is a Riesz space (vector lattice) and E' is an ideal in the order dual E"' that separates 
the points of E. In particular, the dual pair (E, E"') is a Riesz pair, where E is a Riesz 
space and E "'  is its order dual (provided that E"' separates the points of E) . A lattice 
pair (E, E') is a dual pair such that E is a Riesz space and E' is a Riesz subspace of the 
order dual E"' that separates the points of E. Clearly, every Riesz pair is a lattice pair, 
but the converse is false; (ca[O, 1] ,  C[O, 1]) is a lattice pair but not a Riesz pair. A Riesz 
pair (E, E') is symmetric if E is an ideal in (E')"' or, equivalently, if (E', E) is also a 
Riesz pair. Here are two useful properties of Riesz pairs. 
a. A Riesz pair (E, E') is symmetric if and only if the order intervals of E are a(E, E')­
weakly compact. 
b. If (E, E') is a Riesz pair, then (E' , E) is a lattice pair with the property that each 
order interval of E' is a(E', E)-compact [2, Lemma 6.53) .  
If (E, E') is a lattice pair, then an element x E E+ is strictly positive, written x » 0, 
if (x, x') > 0 for each 0 < x' E E'. If E = ]Re, then a positive vector is strictly positive 
if and only if each component of x is strictly positive. Similarly, a vector 0 < x' E E' is 
strictly positive if 0 < x E E+ implies (x, x') > 0. 
For more about Riesz pairs see [11] and [2, Sections 6.15 and 6. 16] .  We are now 
ready to classify -economies aocorc:ling -to the -lattice ·proper-ties of the commodity and 
price spaces. 
3 Preferences and utility functions 
A preference >,::: on a set X is a binary relation on X that is 
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1 .  reflexive: x ):::: x for all x E X, 
2 .  transitive: x ):::: y and y ):::: z imply x ):::: z , and 
3. total: for each x, y E X  with x =I= y either x):::: y or y):::: x . 
The expression x):::: y means x is as good as y. When both x):::: y and y):::: x, then x 
is indifferent to y, written x "'y. In case both x ):::: y and y 'if x,  we say that x is strictly 
pref erred to y ,  denoted x >- y .  
Definition 1 Let ):::: be a preference on a subset X of a vector ·space .. A vector v, not 
necessarily lying in X, is desirable (for ):::: ) if for each x E X there exists some 8 > 0 
such that for each 0 < a < 8 we have x + av E X and x + av >- x. 
We now introduce some important topological , algebraic, and order properties of 
preference relations. A preference relation ):::: on a topological space X is: 
• upper semicontinuous if the upper contour set {y E X : y ):::: x} is closed for 
each x E X. 
• lower semicontinuous if the lower contour set { z E X : x ):::: z} is closed for 
each x E X. 
• continuous if ):::: is both upper and lower semicontinuous. 
When X is a convex subset of a vector space, a preference relation ):::: on X is: 
• convex if the upper contour set {y E X : y ):::: x} is convex for each x E X. 
• strictly convex if y):::: x, z):::: x, y =I= z,  and 0 < a <  1 imply ay + ( 1  - a)z >- x.  
In case the opportunity set X is partially ordered by � ' then we say that a preference 
relation ):::: on X is: 
• monotone (with respect to � ) if x � y implies x):::: y .  
• strictly monotone if x > y implies x >- y .  
An element a E X is maximal for a binary relation ):::: on a set X if  there is  no other 
element x E X with x >- a. When ):::: is total and reflexive this is equivalent to a being a 
greatest element, i.e . ,  a):::: x for all x E X. The next theorem deals with the properties 
and existence of greatest elements for preference relations. 
Theorem 2 For a preference ):::: on a set X :  
1 .  Greatest elements are indifferent to each other. 
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2 .  If X is a compact space and >;:: is upper semicontinuous, then >;:: has greatest ele­
ments. 
3. If X is convex and>;:: is a convex preference, then the (possibly empty) set of greatest 
elements of>;:: is convex. 
4. If X is convex and >;:: is strictly convex, then >;:: has at most one greatest element. 
A utility function for a preference relation >;:: is a function u: X --+ JR such that for 
every x and y, u(x) ;;::: u(y) if and only if x >;:: y. In this case we say u represents >;:: on 
X. Every real function u: X --+ JR gives rise to a preference relation >;:: defined by x >;:: y 
if u(x) ;;::: u(y) .  Note that a utility function is quasiconcave if and only it represents a 
convex preference. 
It is well known that even for finite dimensional commodity spaces, not every prefer­
ence is representable by a utility function. For instance, the lexicopgraphic ordering of 
the plane has no utility. Additional assumptions, typically (semi)continuity assumptions, 
are needed for the existence of a representation. G. Debreu [79, 82) proves the existence 
of a continuous utility for a continuous preference relation on connected subsets of JRn. 
T. Rader [181) and M. K .  Richter [187) give conditions guaranteeing the existence of 
an upper semicontinuous for an upper semicontinuous preference. Debreu's proof makes 
use of the separability of JRn and the Rader-Richter approach uses second countability 
of ]Rn. Unfortunately, infinite dimensional Riesz spaces do not possess either property. 
Nonetheless, S .  Richard and W. Zame [186) prove that uniformly proper, continuous, and 
convex preferences on the positive cone of a normed vector lattice have a representation 
by a continuous utility function. Their construction involves the fact that for uniformly 
proper preferences, there is a ray crossed by every indifference curve. Since each point 
on the ray can be written as a positive multiple a of some fixed vector v ,  the value of a 
where the indifference curve crosses the ray serves as a utility function with the desired 
properties. They also show that uniform properness is almost a necessary condition for 
such a representation. 
4 Exchange economies 
One of the basic economic constructions associated with any market environment is the 
commodity-price duality. G. Debreu [80] was the first to express this in terms of a 
dual pair (X, X') . The vector space X is the commodity space and its vectors are 
known as commodity -·bundles (or commodities) and X' is the price space whose 
vectors are called prices.1 The real number (x, x') is the value of the bundle x at prices 
x' . It is customary in economic theory to designate the price vectors by p, q, etc . ,  instead 
of using primes. Also, the evaluation (x, p) is denoted p ·x ,  i.e. , p ·x  = (x, p) . An exchange 
1 Debreu (80) used the term valuation for elements in the dual and reserved the term price system for 
valuations which could be represented as integrals. 
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economy consists of a set of consumers who exchange goods but are unable to produce 
anything other than their endowment. More formally: 
Definition 3 A (private ownership) exchange economy is a tuple 
where: 
• The commodity-price duality is described by the dual pair (X, X'); X is the com­
modity space and X' is the price space. 
• The economy has m consumers. Each consumer i has a consumption set Xi c X 
and an initial endowment wi E Xi. The vector w = :Z::::Z:,1 Wi is known as the total 
endowment or the social endowment. 
• The tastes of each consumer i are described by his preference relation >::=i on Xi. 
An allocation for any such economy is simply an m-tuple (x1 , . . •  , xm) of vectors such 
that Xi E Xi for each i and :Z::::Z:,1 Xi = w. In other words, allocations are redistributions of 
the social endowment amongst the m consumers of the economy. When X is an ordered 
space, we refer to the order interval [0, w] = {x EX : 0 � x � w} as the Edgeworth 
box of the exchange economy. 
Definition 4 An economy is called: 
• A Riesz economy if its commodity-price duality is described by a Riesz pair (E, E') 
and each consumer's consumption set is E+ . 
• A lattice economy if its commodity-price duality is described by a lattice pair 
(E, E') and each consumer's consumption set is E+ . 
• A Riesz commodity economy if its commodity space is a Riesz space (in which 
case we denote the commodity-price dual pair by (E , X')) and each consumer's 
consumption set is E+ . 
• A Riesz price economy if its price space is a Riesz space (in which case we denote 
the commodity-price dual pair by (X, E')). 
• A convex economy if all preferences and consumption sets are convex. 
• A finite dimensional economy if it is a Riesz economy with Riesz pair (JR£, JR£) 
and the total endowment is strictly positive. 
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5 Efficiency 
The collection of allocations is denoted A, i .e . , 
A = { ( X1 ' . . .  'Xm) : Xi E xi for each i and f Xi = w}. 
i=l 
Clearly, (w1, . . .  , Wm) E A, so A is a nonempty set. The fundamental value judgement 
made in neoclassical economics is that consumers' preferences should be used to evaluate 
their welfare. This leads naturally to the following notions. 
Definition 5 An allocation (xi ,  . . .  , xm) is: 
• Pareto efficient if there is no allocation (zi , . . .  , Zm) satisfying Zi >t=i X i  for all i 
and Zs >- s X8 for some s .  
• weakly Pareto efficient if there is no allocation (z1 , . •  ; , zm) with Zi >- i  X i  for all 
i .  
• individually rational if Xi );:=i W i  for each i .  
The set of individually rational allocations is denoted Ar, i.e. , 
Likewise, the set of weakly Pareto efficient allocations is denoted AwP, i .e . ,  
Awp = { (x1 , . . .  , Xm) EA: There is no (Y1 , . . . , Ym) EA satisfying Yi >-i Xi for each i } .  
Of course, every Pareto efficient allocation is weakly Pareto efficient . But the converse 
is false; see Example 33 below. However, with strictly monotone continuous preferences 
the notions of Pareto and weak Pareto efficiency coincide. 
Lemma 6 In a Riesz commodity exchange economy, if each preference is strictly mono­
tone and lower semicontinuous for some linear topology, then every weakly Pareto efficient 
allocation is Pareto efficient. 
An obvious question js: Do individually rational Pareto efficient allocations exist'? 
Before ansvv.ering this�_question.(affirmatively), we -characterize the compactness of A. 
Theorem 7 In a Riesz commodity exchange economy with weakly closed Edgeworth box 
[O, w] and at least two consumers, the set A of allocations is weakly compact in Em (that 
is, <7(Em, (X')m) -compact) if and only if the Edgeworth box [O,w] is weakly compact (i. e . ,  
<7(E, X') -compact) .  
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Proof : Notice that A c (0, wr. In addition, since a(Em, (X')m) = TI�1 a(E, X') , it 
is easy to see that A is a a(Em, (X')m)-closed subset of Em. Now suppose that the 
Edgeworth box [O, w] is a(E, X')-compact. Then [o , wr is a(Em, (X')m)-compact, so 
the a (Em, (X')m)-closed subset A of [o , wr is likewise a(Em, (X')m)-compact. For the 
converse, assume that A is a a(Em, (X')m)-compact subset of Em and let {xn} be a net 
in [O, w] . Put 
Ya = (xa , W 
-
Xa , 0, 0, . . .  , 0) 
and note that {Yn} is a net in A. Hence, {yn} has a a(Em, (X')m)-convergent subnet in 
Em, and from this it follows that {xn} also has a a(E, X')-convergent subnet in [O, w] .  
Consequently, the Edgeworth box [O , w] is a(E, X')-compact. I 
Theorem 8 In a Riesz commodity exchange economy, if the Edgeworth box [O, w] is 
weakly compact and preferences are weakly upper semicontinuous, then the nonempty 
sets Ar (of all individually rational allocations) and AwP {of weakly Pareto efficient allo­
cations) are both weakly compact. 
Proof : In this case, both Ar and Awp are weakly closed subsets of the weakly compact 
set A. I 
Relatively mild conditions guarantee the existence of individually rational Pareto 
efficient allocations. 
Theorem 9 In a Riesz commodity exchange economy, if the Edgeworth box [O , w] is 
weakly compact and preferences are weakly upper semicontinuous, then individually ra­
tional Pareto efficient allocations exist. 
Proof : Start by introducing on Ar the equivalence relation rv by saying that 
if Xi rvi Zi for each i .  Notice that rv is indeed an equivalence relation on Ar. For simplicity, 
denote the set of all equivalence classes Ar/ rv by Ar again. Next, we define an ordering 
;;;;: on (the equivalence classes) Ar by 
X = (x1 , . . .  , Xm) ;:?; z = (z1 , . . . , Zm) 
if Xi >;:=i zi for each i .  Again, notice that ;;;;: is a partial order on Ar and that the .maximal 
elements of ;:?; are precisely the Pareto efficient allocations. So in order to establish that 
Pareto efficient allocations exist, it suffices to show that ;:?; has maximal elements. For 
this, we need to establish that the partially ordered set (Ar, ;;;;: ) satisfies the hypothesis 
of Zorn's lemma. That is, we must show that every chain of Ar has an upper bound. 
To this end, let C be a chain in Ar, that is, for each pair x, z E C either x ;:?; z or 
z;;;;: x. Put Xa = a  for each a EC and note that {xn} nEC is a net in the weakly compact 
set Ar. If x E Ar is a limit point of the net { Xn}nEC, then it follows from the weak upper 
semicontinuity of the preferences that x ;:?; y for each y E C, as desired. I 
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Corollary 10 In a Riesz commodity exchange economy, if the Edgeworth box [O, w] is 
weakly compact and each preference is convex and continuous with respect to a consistent 
locally convex topology on E, then individually rational Pareto efficient allocations exist. 
Proof : Notice that in this case every preference is weakly upper semicontinuous. I 
6 Efficiency, prices, and the welfare theorems 
We are now ready to discuss efficiency properties of allocations in the presence of prices. 
As we shall see, the Pareto efficiency of an allocation can be characterized in terms of its 
support by prices. We start with the definition of a price-supported allocation. 
Definition 11  An allocation (x1 ,  . . .  , Xm) in an exchange economy is supported by 
prices if there exists a nonzero price p E X' (called a supporting price) such that 
X �i Xi in Xi implies p · X;;:;: p •Xi · 
In Riesz commodity exchange economies supporting prices are positive. 
Lemma 12 In a Riesz commodity exchange economy, if at least one consumer has a 
monotone preference, then every supporting price is positive. 
Proof : Let the first consumer has a monotone preference and let (x1 , . . .  , xm) be an 
allocation supported by a nonzero price p. If x ;;:;: O, then x + x1 �1  x1 , and since p is 
a supporting price, we infer that p · (x + x1) ;;:;: p · x1 . This inequality implies p · x ;;:;: O, 
which means that p ;;:;: 0. I 
The objective of this section is to establish versions of the following efficiency proper­
ties of allocations known as the first and second welfare theorems. These theorems were 
first proven in reasonable generality by K. Arrow [25] and G. Debreu [77, 80], although 
I. Fisher in the 1890s and V. Pareto and 0. Lange in the 1920s knew special cases . The 
two theorems can be stated (subject to appropriate conditions) as: 
• First Welfare Theorem: Every allocation supported by prices is Pareto .. efficient. 
• Second Welfare Theorem: Every Pareto efficient allocation can by supported by 
prices. 
Theorem 13 (First Welfare Theorem) In a lattice exchange economy suppose that: 
1 .  Each preference is continuous for some linear topology; 
2. The total endowment is strictly positive (i. e. ,  w » O}; and 
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3. At least one consumer has a monotone preference. 
Then every allocation supported by prices is weakly Pareto efficient. 
Proof : Given the hypotheses, let (x1 , . . .  , Xm) be an allocation supported by a price p. 
By Lemma 12, we have p > 0. Suppose by way of contradiction that (x1 ,  . . .  , Xm) is not 
weakly Pareto efficient. Then there exists another allocation (z1 ,  . .. , Zm) with Zi >- i  X i  
for each i .  Since p is supporting, we infer that p · Z i  � p · Xi for each i ,  and from the 
identity 
m m m m 
LP' Zi = p· (L zi) = p· w = p· (L x i) = LP'Xi, 
i=l i=l i=l i=l 
we see that p · Zi = p · X i for each i. Now from w = 2::�1 Xi » 0 and p > 0, we have 
p · w = 2::�1 p · X i > O. In particular, there exists some s with p · X8 > 0. Since );:8 is 
continuous for some linear topology, there exists some 0 < o < 1 such that Oz8 >- s X8, 
and since p is supporting, we obtain p · (oz8) � p · X8• However, we also have 
p. (ozs) = Op. Zs = op. Xs < p. Xs, 
which is a contradiction. Hence, the allocation (x1, • . .  , xm) must be weakly Pareto 
efficient. I 
In finite dimensional economies, it is relatively easy to establish the second welfare 
theorem too. 
Theorem 14 (Second Welfare Theorem) If a finite dimensional exchange economy 
is convex and the total endowment is desirable for each consumer, then every weakly 
Pareto efficient (and hence every Pareto efficient) allocation can be supported by prices. 
The infinite dimensional analogue of the Second Welfare Theorem 14 may fail, as we 
can see from the following example. 
Example 15 (Aliprantis-Burkinshaw [12])  Consider a Riesz exchange economy with 
two consumers having the following characteristics: 
• Commodity-price duality the symmetric Riesz pair (£1 ,  £00). 
• Initial endowments w1 = W2 = ( 2
1
a , 2
1
s , • • •  , 22;+1 , . . . ) . 
• Preferences for both agents are represented on ft by the utility function 
·oo 
u(x) = L IPn(Xn) ,  
n=l 
where the functions <pn: JR---+ JR are defined by 
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if t � 2in; 
if t > 2in • 
This utility was introduced by A. Mas-Colell (152]. Since t � 0 implies 0 � 'Pn (t) � 2� +t, 
notice that the series defining u converges for each x = ( x1 , x2 , • • •  ) E .et. 
A direct verification shows that the utility function is concave, strictly monotone, and 
norm continuous. In addition, note that the total endowment w = w1 + w2 is strictly 
positive. We now claim that the allocation (w1 , w2) is Pareto efficient (hence weakly 
Pareto efficient) but fails to be supported by prices. 
We establish first that (w1 , w2) is Pareto efficient. To see this, start by observing 
that if a =  (a1 , a2 , • • •  ) and b = (b1 , b2 , • • •  ) are two arbitrary positive sequences satisfying 
0 � an + bn � 2-2n for all n, then 
u(a + b) = u(a) + u(b) . 
Next, let (x1 ,  x2) be an allocation satisfying x1 >,:: w1 and x2 >,:: w2. From x1 +x2 = w1 +w2 
and the above observation, we see that 
u(x1) + u(x2) = u(x1 + x2) = u(w1 + w2) = u(w1) + u(w2) . 
From u(x1 ) � u(w1) and u(x2) � u(w2) , we infer that u(x1) = u(w1) and u(x2) = u(w2) . 
This implies that the allocation (w1 , w2) is Pareto efficient. 
Finally, we establish that the allocation (w1 , w2) cannot be supported by prices. To 
this end, let p E £00 be a price that supports (wi, w2) .  By the monotonicity of the utility 
function u, it follows that p � 0. Also, an easy computation shows that ( 1  - 2-k)w1 + 
2-2k ek >- w1 , where ek denotes the sequence whose kth component is one and every other is equal to zero. Since p is supporting, we get 
(1 - 2-k)p · W1 + 2-2kp · ek � p ' W1 • 
Consequently, 0 � 2kp · w1 � p · ek � llPlloo < oo for all k. Thus, p · w1 = 0, and since all 
components of w1 are positive, we see that p = O, which means that (w1 , w2) cannot be 
supported by prices. 0 
In order to establish the second welfare theorem in infinite dimensional spaces, we 
need to add an additional condition on preferences. This property is known as properness 
and is the subject of the next section. 
7 Properness 
As we saw above, in order to establish the second welfare theorem, we need some ad­
ditional condition on preferences. This new property was introduced to the economic 
literature by G. Chichilnisky and P. J. Kalman [72 ] (see also (70]) as "the cone condi­
tion" and was popularized in general equilibrium theory by A. Mas-Colell [152] under 
the name of "properness." 
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Definition 16 (Properness) Let E be a Riesz space, r a linear topology on E, v > 0, 
and V a r-neighborhood of zero. A preference relation>;::: on E+ is: 
1 .  ( v, V)-proper at a point x E E+ if x - av + z >;::: x in E+ with a > 0 implies 
z ¢av, 
2. uniformly ( v, V)-proper if x - av + z >;::: x in E+ with a > 0 implies z ¢ aV. 
Any vector v that satisfies the second property for some neighborhood V is called a 
vector of uniform properness for>;:::. When the vector v and the neighborhood V are 
clear from the context, we simply say that >;::: is uniformly proper. In case we want to 
emphasize the vector v only, we say that >;::: is v-uniformly proper. If we wish to emphasize 
the topology r, then we say that >;::: is uniformly r-proper. 
Lemma 17 Vectors of uniform properness are desirable. 
Proof : Let >;::: be a (v, V)-uniformly proper preference. Fix x E E+ and let a > 0. If 
x >;::: x + av ,  then from (x + av) - av + 0 = x >;::: x + av, it follows that 0 ¢ aV, which is 
impossible . Hence, x + av >- x for all x E E+ and each a > 0. I 
A nonempty open set r is an open cone if ax E r whenever x E r and each a > 0. 
The next result characterizes uniform properness in terms of open cones. 
Theorem 18 (Mas-Colell [152]) Let r be a locally convex topology on the Riesz space 
E and let >;::: be a preference on E+ . Then >;::: is uniformly r-proper if and only if there 
exists a non-empty r-open convex cone r such that 
1 .  r n ( -E+) -:/= 0; and 
2. (x + I') n {y EE+: y >;::: x} = 0 for all x EE+. 
For a proof see [8, Theorem 3.2.3, p. 1 17] . 
The following is a consequence of the preceding result. An AM space with unit is 
a Banach lattice E where the norm is of the form l l xll = inf{>. >  0: lx l ::;; >.e} for some 
e in E. 
Theorem 19 (Mas-Colell [152]) If a monotone preference on the positive cone of an 
AM-space with unit has a- desirable bundle, then it is uniformly norm proper. In partic­
ular, every monotone preference on the positive cone of some JRl space with a desirable 
bundle is uniformly .proper. 
For a proof see [8, Theorem 3 .2 .4, p. 1 18] . 
Strictly positive vectors are a source of vectors of uniform properness. A locally 
convex-solid topology on a Riesz space is a topology with a neighborhood base at 
zero consisting of solid convex sets. 
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Lemma 20 Let (E, E') be a Riesz pair and let 7 be a consistent locally convex-solid 
topology on E. If>,::: is a uniformly 7-proper preference on E+, then every strictly positive 
element of E is a vector of uniform 7-propemess for >,:: . 
Proof : Let e be a strictly positive vector in E. Then the principal ideal Ae is weakly 
(and hence 7) dense in E; see [2, Theorem 6.51) . Since >,::: is uniformly 7-proper, there 
exists a 7-neighborhood V of zero and some v > 0 such that 
x - av + z >,::: x in E+ with a > 0 implies z ¢ a V. 
Next, choose a convex and solid 7-neighborhood W of zero with v ¢W and W + W c V. 
Pick some y E Ae with v - y E W. Replacing y by v A y+ and taking into account 
the inequality Iv - (v A y+) I � I v - y l , we can suppose without loss of generality that 
0 < y � v .  Now note that if x - ay + z >,::: x in E+ with a > 0, then from (*) and the 
relation 
x - av + [z - a(y - v)] = x - ay + z >,::: x, 
we see that z - a(y - v) ¢ aV. So if z E aW, then 
z - a(y - v) E aW + aW = a( W + W) c aV, 
which is a contradiction. The above show that in (*) , we can assume (replacing v by y) 
that 0 < v E Ae. Now if we pick some A > 0 such that 0 < y � Ae, then it is easy to 
see that A e  is a vector of uniform 7-properness for >,:::, and consequently e itself is also a 
vector of uniform 7-properness. I 
As an application of the preceding result, let us show that Mas-Colell 's preference 
relation >,::: introduced in Example 15 is not uniformly norm proper. 
Corollary 21 The preference relation>,::: on ft represented by the utility function 
where 
is not uniformly norm proper. 
00 
u( x1 , X2, . . .  ) = L 'Pn(Xn) ,  
n=l 
if t � 2�n 1 
if t > 2�n 1 
Proof : To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that >,:::·is uniformly norm proper. 
Then by Lemma 20, the strictly positive vector v = Ua, 215 , • • •  , 22,;+i, . . .  ) must be a 
vector of uniform norm properness for >,:::. That is, there exists some c > 0 such that 
x - av + z >,::: x in ft implies l l z l l 1 � ac. Now note that v - 2-nv + 2-2n en >- v for 
each n, where en denotes the sequence having its nth component equal to one and every 
other equal to zero. Hence, 2-2n l l en l l i � 2-nc or 1 � 2nc for each n, which is impossible. 
Hence >,::: cannot be uniformly norm proper. I 
15 
Consider a dual pair (X, X') and let >,:: be a preference relation on a subset S of X. 
As usual , we say that a price p E X' supports the preference >,:: at x E S if y E S 
and y >,:: x imply p · y � p · x. 
If A is a subset of X, then its (absolute) polar A 0 is defined by 
A 0 = { x' E X' : I (x, x') I � 1 for all x E A}. 
The classical Alaoglu theorem [2 , Theorem 4.79, p. 158] asserts that if V is a neighborhood 
of zero for any consistent locally convex topology on X, then its polar v0 is a a(X', X)­
compact subset of X'. 
The next theorem presents a crucial relationship between properness and supporting 
prices . 
Theorem 22 Let (E, E') be a lattice pair and let T be a consistent locally convex topology 
on E .  Assume that >,:: is a convex, monotone, preference relation on E+ that is also (v, V)­
uniformly proper for some symmetric T -neighborhood V. Also, define the supporting price 
correspondence 7/J: E+ -» E' by 
7/J(x) = {p E v0 n E� : p supports >,:: at x and p · v = l}. 
Then we have the following. 
1 .  The correspondence 7/J has nonempty, convex, and a(E' , E)-compact values. 
2. If, in addition, the preference >,:: is r -upper semicontinuous, then the correspondence 
7/J is also ( r, w*) -upper hemicontinuous. 
Proof: (1) Clearly, the correspondence 7/J has convex values. We first show that 7/J has 
nonempty values. Pick x in E+ and set P = {y E E+ : y >,:: x} and C = U>.>o A(-v + V) . 
Clearly Pis a nonempty convex set and C is a convex cone with the origin deleted having 
nonempty interior. Moreover C n (P- x) = 0. Indeed if A(-v + w) = y - x with A >  0, 
w E V, and y >,:: x, then x - AV + AW = y >,:: x, so by the properness of >,:: we get 
>iw ¢ A V, or w ¢ V, a contradiction. Now by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem [2 , 
Theorem 4.46, p. 143), there is a nonzero p E E' satisfying p · z � p · y for all z E P - x 
and all y E C. Since C is a cone, it easily follows that p · z � 0 � p · y for all z E P - x 
and all y E C. In particular, we have p · y � p · x for all y >,:: x. That is, p supp()rts >,:: at 
x. 
Next, note that p�O. :For1f z � O, then x+z >,:: x, so p · (x + z) � p · x , which implies 
p · z � 0. Next we show that p · v > 0. First note that -v E C, s o p ·  v � 0. If p · v = 0, 
then -v + V c C implies that p · u � 0 for each u E V. Since V is symmetric, p · u = 0 
for each u E V, which in turn implies p = 0, a contradiction. Replacing p by fv, we may 
assume that p · v = 1. Now note that if u E V, then -v ± u EC, so p ·  (-v ± u) � 0. 
Therefore, ±p · u � p · v = 1, or IP · ul � 1 for each u E V. That is, p E v0. Thus 
p E 7/J(x) , so 7/J has nonempty values. 
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To see that the convex set 'lj;(x) is a(E', E)-compact note first that 'lf;(x) C v0 and 
that V0 is (by Alaoglu's Theorem) a(E' , E)-compact. It is easy to see that 'lf;(x) is 
a(E', E)-closed, so a(E', E)-compact. 
(2) To establish that 'lj; is (7, a(E', E))-upper hemicontinuous, it suffices (since the 
range of 'lj; is contained in the a(E', E)-compact set v0) to show that 'lj; has a closed 
graph. To this end, assume Xa 2+ x, Pa. E 'lf;(xa) ,  and Pa u(E',E) p. We need to show 
that z >,:: x implies p · z ;:: p · x. So suppose that z >,:: x. Since v is (by Lemma 17) 
desirable, for each c > 0, z£ = z + cv satisfie� z£ >- x. Since Xa 2+ x and >,:: is 7-upper 
semicontinuous, eventually z£ >- Xa, and consequently Pa · z£ ;:: Pa · Xa eventually. Since 
v0 is a (E', E)-compact, the evaluation is jointly (7, a(E', E))-continuous on E x  v0, so 
letting c --+ 0, in the limit p · z ;:: p · x. I 
In essence, the notion of properness replaces the interiority assumption of the positive 
cone. Since only subspaces of C(n)-spaces can have a positive cone with nonempty 
interior (see [2, Section 7.5] ) ,  the notion of properness provides the means of studying 
general equilibrium problems in infinite dimensional Riesz spaces whose cones have empty 
interiors. On the other hand, properness is not a panacea. The positive cone of an 
arbitrary Riesz space need not admit proper preferences that satisfy the other standard 
properties. For instance, for the Riesz space 1Roo (the Riesz space of real sequences 
equipped with the product topology) there is no proper continuous preference on JRti 
that can be represented by a quasiconcave and strictly monotone utility function; see [8 , 
Example 3.6 .9 ,  p. 174] . 
As pointed out at the beginning of the section, the notion of properness has been used 
and studied extensively in the literature; see, for instance, C. D. Aliprantis, D. J. Brown, 
and 0. Burkinshaw [5, 6, 7] , A. Araujo and P. Monteiro [23] , M. Florenzano [99] , 
L. E. Jones [ 119 ,  121] ,  M. A. Khan and N. T. Peck [126] , A. Mas-Colell [152, 153] ,  A. Mas­
Colell and S. F. Richard [154] , A. Mas-Colell and W. R. Zame [155] , S. F. Richard [184] ,  
S .  F .  Richard and S .  Srivastava [185] , S .  F. Richard and W. R. Zame [186] , N .  C .  Yannelis 
and W. R. Zame [220] , and W. R. Zame [222] . 
8 Properness and efficiency 
When preferences are uniformly proper the pathology of Example 15 cannot occur. 
A. Mas-Colell has established that under the additional assumption of uniform proper­
ness (and a few .other� stalldard.assumptions) the second welfare theorem is valid for Riesz 
exchange economies. 
Theorem 23 (The Mas-Colell Second Welfare Theorem [152]) In a Riesz exchange 
economy, if preferences are convex, monotone, and uniformly 7-proper for a consistent 
locally convex-solid topology 7 on E, then every weakly Pareto efficient allocation is sup­
ported by prices. Moreover, if for each i we pick a convex solid 7-neighborhood Vi of zero 
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and a vector Vi > 0 that satisfy the definition of uniform properness for >ri, then every 
weakly Pareto efficient allocation can be supported by a price p > 0 that satisfies 
p. (t, v;) = 1 and IP · zi ,. 1 for all z EV= [P'<· 
For a proof see [152) or [8, Theorem 3.5.4, p. 154). For lattice exchange economies A. Mas­
Colell and S. F. Richard established the following remarkable version of the second welfare 
theorem. 
Theorem 24 (The Mas-Colell-Richard Second Welfare Theorem [154]) In a lat­
�tice exchange economy, if the preference of each consumer is convex, monotone, and 
w-uniformly proper, then every weakly efficient allocation can be supported by prices. 
The proof of this theorem utilizes the lattice properties of the price space in an elegant 
manner. We indicate below the basic ideas involved. For details see [154). 
We first set up some notation . We let E = Em, E' = (E')m , and consider the lattice 
pair (E, E') under the obvious duality. The elements of E and E' are indicated by boldface 
letters. The preference relation >;= on E+ is defined by x >;= y if X i  >ri Yi for each i. As 
usual, a price p = (p1 , • . .  , Pm) E E' supports x E E+ if y >;= x implies p · y ;;:=: p · x. (This 
is equivalent to the condition that if x >ri Xi for some i, then Pi · x ;;:=: Pi · x i-) 
Lemma 25 (Mas-Colell-Richard) Consider a lattice exchange economy such that the 
preference of each consumer is convex, monotone, and w-uniformly proper. Then there 
exists a nonempty convex and weakly compact subset K, ofE� consisting of nonzero prices 
with the following property: If x E E+ is a weakly Pareto efficient allocation, then the 
subset K(x) of K, defined by 
K(x) = {p EK,: p supports x and x maximizes p over all allocations A}, 
is nonempty, convex, and weakly compact. 
Proof of Theorem 24: Let x = (xi, . . .  , Xm) be a weakly Pareto efficient allocation. Fix 
some p = (p1 ,  . . .  , pm) E K(x) and let 7r = V';.1 Pi > 0. From the definition of the 
members of K(x) and the definition of the supremum of a finite set of linear functionals, 
it follows that 7r • w = L:';.1 Pi ·Xi. Moreover, 7r ;;:=: Pi implies 7r ·Xi ;;:=: Pi ·Xi for each i. 
Summing up, we-g€t 7r • w = L:';.1 7r ·Xi ;;:=: I::';.1 Pi� Xi = 7r • w; so 7r ·Xi = Pi· Xi follows 
for each i. 
Now, we claim that 7r supports x. To see this, let x >ri Xi· Then 7r • x ;;:=: Pi • x ;;:=: 
Pi ·X i  = 7r • x i, as desired. I 
For an illustration of Theorem 24 see the discussion after Example 59. 
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9 Walrasian Equilibrium 
In an exchange economy, the budget set of consumer i at prices p E X' is the set 
Bi (p) = { x E Xi : p · x � p · Wi}. 
At prices p consumer i chooses a bundle from Bi (p) that is best under the preference 
relation i;=i. Any such choice bundle is known as a demand vector for consumer i. 
When at some prices p we can select demand bundles for all consumers that clear the 
market, then we say that the economy is in equilibrium. Formally, we have the following 
definition. 
Definition 26 An allocation (x1, . . .  , Xm) in an exchange economy is: 
• a competitive (or a Walrasian) equilibrium if for some nonzero price p EX', 
each Xi is a maximal element in consumer i's budget set Bi(p) .  
• a quasiequilibrium if there exists some nonzero price p E X' such that x i;=i X i  
in Xi implies p · X ;::: p 
• 
Wi. 
For simplicity, a competitive equilibrium is also called an equilibrium. Here are 
some elementary properties of equilibria. 
Lemma 27 For an allocation (xi, . . .  , Xm) in an exchange economy we have: 
1 .  The allocation (xi, ... , xm) is a competitive equilibrium with respect t o  some nonzero 
price p EX' if and only if X i  E Bi(P) for each i and x >- i  X i  in Xi implies p·x > p·wi. 
2. If each consumer has a desirable bundle, then every competitive equilibrium is a 
quasi equilibrium. 
Proof: The proof of (1) is well known. 
(2) Assume that (xi, . . . , Xm) is a competitive equilibrium with respect to some 
nonzero price p E X' and let vi be a desirable commodity for consumer i. So if x i;=i Xi 
in Xi, then there exists some o > 0 such that 0 < a < o implies x + avi >- i  X i, and 
consequently 
p · (x + avi) = p · x + ap ·vi> p · Wi 
for each 0 < a < o. Letting a--+ o+, we get p · x ;::: p · wi, so that (x1, . . . ,xm) is a 
quasiequili bri um. I 
Theorem 30 below gives conditions under which a quasiequilibrium is also an equilib­
rium. The next set of results includes a few more properties of equilibria. 
Lemma 28 If (xi, ... , xm) is a quasiequilibrium in an exchange economy with respect 
to a nonzero price p E X', then p · X i = p · wi for each i (so the price p supports the 
allocation). 
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Because of the preceding result, any nonzero price that makes an allocation an equi­
librium or a quasiequilibrium is referred to as a supporting price for the allocation. 
Lemma 29 In a Riesz commodity exchange economy, if one consumer has a strictly 
monotone preference, then every price supporting an equilibrium is strictly positive. 
Proof: Assume that the first consumer has a strictly monotone preference and that a 
non-zero price p supports an equilibrium (xi, ... , Xm)· By Lemma 12 ,  we know that 
the price p is positive. Now let x > 0. Then the strict monotonicity of >t==i implies 
Xi +x >-i xi. This implies p· (xi +x) = p·xi +p · x  > P•Wi = p·xi, so p·x > 0, proving 
that p >> 0 .  I 
In a quasiequilibrium, if consumers have positive income, then in fact it is an equi­
librium. 
Theorem 30 Assume that in a lattice exchange economy preferences are continuous for 
some linear topology. If an allocation (xi, ... , Xm) is a quasiequilibrium with respect to a 
nonzero price p E E' and p · wi > 0 for some i, then Xi is a maximal element in Bi(p). 
In particular, if p · Wi > 0 for each i, then the allocation (x1, ... , Xm) is a competitive 
equilibrium. 
Proof: By Lemma 28, we know that p ·Xi = p · Wi, so Xi E Bi(P) for each i. Now let 
p·wi > 0 for some i, and assume by way of contradiction that there exists some x E Bi(P) 
(i .e. , p · x � p · wi) such that x >-i Xi· Since the preference >t==i is continuous for some 
linear topology, there exists some 0 < o < 1 such that ox >-i Xi· Since p supports the 
allocation, we see that 
op· x = p ·(ox) � p · wi. 
On the other hand, we have Op·x � Op·wi < p·wi, which is impossible, and the conclusion 
follows. I 
Corollary 31 For a lattice exchange economy assume that for some linear topology every 
preference relation is continuous. If a quasiequilibrium is supported by a price p with 
p · w > 0, then the quasiequilibrium is weakly Pareto efficient. 
Proof: Repeat the proof of Theorem 13  and use Theorem 30. I 
Corollary 32 In a lattice exchange economy, if preferences are strictly monotone and 
continuous /.or ..wme lir:i.eO.r.,;topology--and .. the-.total -endowment is-strictly positive, then an 
allocation is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it is a quasiequilibrium. Moreover, in 
this case, every nonzero price that supports a quasiequilibrium must be strictly positive. 
Proof: Let (xi, ... , Xm) be a quasiequilibrium supported by a nonzero price p. Clearly, 
p > 0. We claim that p >> 0 is also true. To see this, start by noticing that w >> 0 
implies p · w = .z::=:,i p · wi > 0. So p · W i > 0 for some i. By Theorem 30 the bundle Xi 
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is a maximal element in Bi (p) . Now let x > 0. If p · x = 0, then p · (xi + x) = p · wi 
(i.e . ,  x + Xi E Bi (P)) and by the strict monotonicity of >,::: i, we see that x + Xi >- i  Xi, 
which contradicts the maximality of Xi· Thus, p · x > 0, which means that p is strictly 
positive. Now to complete the proof notice that p · Wi > 0 for each i and then invoke 
Theorem 30. I 
In general, a quasiequilibrium need not be a competitive equilibrium. Here is a simple 
example. 
Example 33 Consider a two consumer 2-dimensional exchange economy with the fol­
lowing characteristics: 
• Consumer 1 :  Initial endowment w1 = ( �, 0) and preference >,:::1 represented by the 
utility function u1 (x, y) = x + y. 
• Consumer 2 :  Initial endowment w2 = ( �, 1) and preference >,:::2 represented by the 
utility function u2 (x, y) = y.  
A straightforward argument shows that the allocation ( (1 ,  0) , (0 ,  1)) is a quasiequilib­
rium with respect to the price p = (0, 1) but fails to be a competitive equilibrium. 
Since (1 ,  0) >-1 w1 and (0, 1) >,:::2 w2, observe that (w1 , w2) is not a Pareto efficient 
allocation. However, it is easy to see that (wi , w2) is weakly Pareto efficient. D 
1 0  Continuity properties of supporting prices 
Consider an allocation (x1 , . . .  , xm) in an exchange economy. We say that a linear func­
tional p (called a price) on a vector subspace Y of the commodity space that contains 
each Xi supports the allocation (x1 , . . .  , Xm) on Y if X E Xi n Y and X >,:= i  Xi imply 
p · x � p · Xi . Our purpose here is to discuss two important continuity properties of 
supporting prices. 
Recall that if E is a Riesz space and z E E+ , then the principal ideal (or simply the 
ideal) Ez generated by z is the vector subspace 
Ez . {x E E : ::l .X > O such that jxj � .Xz} . 
If we define the real function II · l l00;Ez --+ [D, oo) by 
l lx l loo = inf{.X > 0 :  lx l � .Xz} , 
then II · l loo is a lattice seminorm on Ez (i.e . ,  lx l � IY I implies l lx l l00 � l lY l loo) · If E is an 
Archimedean Riesz space, then I I  · 1 100 is also a norm, and in fact an M-norm. In case E 
is an Archimedean uniformly complete Riesz space (in particular a Banach lattice) , then 
Ez is an AM-space-in which case (Ez·, I I  · 1 100) is lattice isometric to a C(O)-space (0 
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Hausdorff and compact) with z corresponding to the constant function one on n. The 
norm dual E� of (Ez , I I · 1 !00) is an AL-space-which is lattice isometric to some concrete 
L1 (µ)-space. For details on AM- and AL-spaces see [1 1] and [2, Section 7.4] . 
Returning now to our setting, we see that the Edgeworth box [O, w] incorporates all the 
economic activities of a Riesz commodity exchange economy. In fact, [O, w] lies entirely 
in Ew. Therefore, although the commodity-price duality of the economy is described in 
terms of the dual pair ( E, X') , the underlying Riesz pair ( Ew ,  E�) is a more realistic 
Riesz pair that describes the commodity-price duality of the economy. This Riesz pair 
appears over and over in the following discussion. 
Theorem 34 (Aliprantis-Brown-Burkinshaw [5] ) In a Riesz exchange economy as­
sume: 
a. Preferences are lower semicontinuous for a consistent locally convex-solid topology 
T on E. 
b. Every consumer desires the total endowment w. 
Assume further that a positive linear functional p on Ew (the ideal generated by w in E} 
supports an allocation. Then: 
1 .  The linear functional p is T-continuous on the Edgeworth box [O, w] .  
2 .  If, in addition, [O, w] is weakly compact, then p is also order continuous on Ew, i. e., 
Za .,j, 0 in Ew implies p · Za .,j, 0. 
Proof : Let a positive price p on Ew support the allocation (x1 , . . .  , Xm) ·  
(1) Consider first the case of a net {Va} that satisfies 0 ( Va ( Xi for some i and all 
a and Va 2+ 0. Fix £ > 0. From Xi - Va + £W 2+ Xi + £W, X i  + £W >- i  Xi, and the lower a 
7-semicontinuity of >,:: i, we see that there exists some a0 such that Xi - Va +  £W >- i  X i  for 
all a �  ao . So 
p 
• 
(Xi - Va + £W) = p ·X i  - p • Va + £p • W � p · X i  
for all a � a0• Thus, 0 ( p · Va ( £P · w for all a � ao, which means that lima p · Va = 0. 
Next, we consider a net { va} satisfying 0 ( Va ( w = L:::,1 Xi for each a and· Va 2+ 0. 
By the Riesz Decomposition Property [2 , Section 6.5, p. 215] ,  we can write Va = L:::,1 v� 
with 0 ( v� ::;;; Xi · Since,()·� v� � Va for alh :¥'"8.nd all i, it follows from the local solidness 
of T that v� � 0. By the preceding case, we get 
m m 
limp · Va = lim "'"""" p · v� = "'"""" limp · v� = 0.  a a � � a i=l i=l 
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Finally, we consider the general case. That is, assume that a net { va} in [O, w] satisfies 
Va 2t v. Then Iva - vi ::;; w for each a and Iva - v i  2t 0. Now use the preceding case and 
the inequality IP · Va - p · v i ::;; p · Iva - v i  to conclude that lima p · Va =  p · v . 
(2) Assume { va} � [O, w] for each a and Va .J.. 0. Since [O, w] is weakly compact, it 
follows that {Va} has a weakly convergent subnet and from this, we infer that Va � 0. 
Now let V be a convex, solid and 7-closed neighborhood of zero. Notice that E� n v0 
(where v0 is the polar of V in E') equipped with the w*-topology is a compact set (see [2, 
Theorem 4 .79)) . In addition, if we consider each Va as a .reaLvalued function on E� n v0 
via the formula va (f) = f(va) , then each Va is continuous. From Va �  0, we see that 
va (f) .J.. 0 for each f E E� n V0 . Thus, from Dini 's Theorem [2 , Theorem 2.62) ,  the net 
{Va }  converges uniformly to zero on E� n v0 . An easy argument now shows that there 
exists some a0 such that Va E v00 = V for all a �  a0 • Hence, Va 2t 0, as desired. I 
A positive linear functional that supports an allocation on Ew need not be 7-continuous 
on Ew (although it is 7-continuous on the Edgeworth box [O, w]) .  An example follows. 
Example 35 (Aliprantis-Burkinshaw [12] )  Consider the Riesz exchange economy 
discussed in Example 15 .  Notice that 
W = W1 + W2 = ( 2
12 , � ,  • · · , 2in , • · ·) · 
Clearly, w » 0,  so Ew is norm dense in f.1 ,  i .e . ,  Ew = f.1 .  
Now . consider the price p = ( 2 ,  22 , 23 , • • •  , 2n, . . .  ) . Then p defines a positive price on 
Ew; in fact , notice that p · w = 2:�1 2� = 1 .  We claim that p supports the allocation 
( w1 , w2) on Ew as a Walrasian equilibrium. This follows from the following two facts. 
(1 )  u(wi) = p · wi = � and (2) p · x � u(x) for each x E .et n Ew. 
To see (1) , note that 'Pn ( 22l-+1 ) = 2n · 22!+1 = 2n�1 , so 
00 00 
u(wi) = L 'Pn ( 22l"+1 ) = L 2n;1 = P · Wi = � ·  
n=l n=l 
For (2) notice first t � 0 implies 2nt � 'Pn(t) for each n. Indeed, if t ::;; 
'Pn (t) = 2nt . On the other hand, if t > 2in , then 
2nt = (2n - l)t + t � (2n 
-
1) • 2in + t = 2� - 2in + t = 'Pn(t) . 
Consequently, for x = (x1 , X2 , . • •  ) E .et n Ew, we have 
00 00 
P · X = L 2n�n � L 'Pn(xn) = u(x) . 
n=l n=l 
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22n l then 
Now observe that if x >- i  wi in E;!;, then p · x ;::: u(x) > u(wi) = p · wi, so p ·  x > p · Wi. 
In other words, p supports (w1 , w2) on Ew as a Walrasian equilibrium. Finally, note that 
the price p is not fi-norm continuous on Ew. Indeed, if Xn = (0, . . .  , 0, 2� ,  0, O, . . .  ) E Ew, 
then l lxn l l 1 = .Jn -+ 0 while p · Xn = 1 for each n. D 
The pathology of Example 35 cannot occur in a Riesz exchange economy with proper 
preferences. N. C. Yannelis and W. R. Zame have shown that when preferences are 
proper, every price that supports an allocation on the ideal Ew is necessarily topologically 
continuous on Ew. 
Theorem 36 (Yannelis-Zame [220]) In a Riesz exchange economy, if every prefer­
ence is uniformly 7-proper on Ew for some locally convex-solid consistent topology 7 on 
E, then every positive price on Ew that supports an allocation is 7-continuous on Ew . 
Proof: Consider a Riesz exchange economy satisfying the properties of the theorem and 
let an allocation (x1 , . . .  , Xm) be supported by a price 0 < p E E� . Since every vector of 
E;!; is bounded by a multiple of w, it follows that w is a vector of uniform properness. So 
there exists a convex, solid 7-neighborhood V of zero such that x - aw + z >r i  x in E; 
and a >  0 imply z � av. 
Next , consider the Minkowski lattice seminorm p of V defined on E by the formula 
p(y) = inf {A > 0 : y E AV} for each y E E. Clearly, p is a 7-continuous seminorm on E 
and, as we shall see, one of its multiples dominates p on Ew. 
Assume first 0 � z � w = L::,1 Xi· Then by the Riesz Decomposition Property we 
can write z = L::,1 Zi with 0 � Zi � Xi for each i .  Put ai = p(zi) and let c > 0 be 
fixed . For each i let Yi = Xi + (ai + c)w - Zi ;::: 0. Clearly, Xi = Yi - (ai + c)w + Zi ;::: 0. 
If Yi - ( ai + € )w + Zi >;=i Yi, then by the uniform 7-properness of >;=i on Ew, we see that 
Zi � (ai + c)V, which contradicts p(zi) = ai. Therefore, Yi >- i  Yi - (ai + c)w + Zi = Xi· 
Since p supports (xi , . . .  , Xm) on Ew, it follows that 
P · Yi ;::: P · X i  = P 
· 
[Yi - ( ai + € )w + Zi] = P · Yi - ( ai + € ) p  · W + P · Zi · 
Hence, p · Zi � ( ai + c ) p  · w for each i and all c > 0, from which it follows that p · Zi � 
aip · w = (p · w)p(zi) � (p · w)p(z) . This implies 
m m 
p · z = L: p · Zi � (L: p· w)p(z) = m(p · w)p(z) 
i=l i=l 
for all z with 0 � z � w. Now consider any z E Ew . Pick some A >  0 such that l z l � AW 
and note that 
IP · z l � P · lzl = AP · Ct lz i )  � Am(p · w)p(* lz l ) = m(p · w)p(z) . 
Thus, the price p is dominated by a 7-continuous seminorm on Ew and therefore is itself 
7-continuous on Ew. I 
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1 1  The utility space and efficiency 
In this section, we discuss the utility space of an exchange economy. We consider a Riesz 
commodity exchange economy with commodity-price dual pair (E, X') in which prefer­
ences are represented by monotone quasiconcave utility functions. The utility function 
of consumer i is written ui. Without loss of generality, we further assume that ui(O) = 0. 
Unless otherwise stated, when we say that a utility function is continuous it should be 
understood that the utility function is continuous for some consistent locally convex 
topology on E. 
A free disposal allocation is an m-tuple (x1 ,  . . .  ' Xm) satisfying Xi E xi for each i 
and I:;:1 Xi � w. A utility allocation is vector of the form (u1 (x1 ) ,  . . .  , um(xm)) , where 
(xi , . . .  , Xm) is a free disposal allocation. If x = (xi , . . .  , Xm) is a free disposal allocation, 
then for simplicity we write u(x) for (u1 (x1) ,  . . .  , um(xm)) .  
Definition 37 The set of utility allocations is called the utility space of the economy, 
denoted U, i. e. , 
U = { u (x) = (u1 (x1 ) ,  . . .  , um(xm)) : x = (x1 ,  . . .  , Xm) is a free disposal allocation} .  
The utility space enjoys two simple properties. 
Lemma 38 For a Riesz commodity exchange economy we have the following. 
1 .  The utility space U is comprehensive in the sense that if 0 � y � z in lllm and 
z E U, then y EU. 
2. If w is desirable for each consumer, then there exists some c > 0 such that 0 � z E 
lllm with l lzl l  < c implies z E U. 
Proof : (1) To see this, let 0 � y = (y1 , . . .  , Ym) � z = (z1 , . . .  , Zm) E U. Pick a 
free disposal allocation (x1 , . . .  , Xm) with Zi = ui(xi) for each i .  Since the real valued 
function fi(t) = ui(txi) , 0 � t � 1 ,  is continuous, there exists (by the Intermediate Value 
Theorem) some 0 � ti � 1 such that Yi = ui(t ix i) · Clearly, (t1x1 , . . .  , tmxm) is a free 
disposal allocation, so y E U. 
(2) If w is desirable for each consumer, then ui(;kw) > 0 for each i .  So by part (1) , 
the number c = min { ui ( ! w) : i = 1, . . .  , m} satisfies the desired property. I 
Since (in the case of monotone preferences) for any free disposal allocation (x1 , . . .  , Xm) 
we have ui(xi) � ui(w) for each i ,  we see that the utility space U is always a (nonempty) 
bounded subset of lll� .  When is U compact ? Or, equivalently, When is the utility space 
U closed? The next theorem provides the answer. 
Lemma 39 In a Riesz commodity exchange economy whose consumer preferences are 
represented by monotone continuous utility functions, the following statements are equiv­
alent. 
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1 .  The utility space U is a closed subset of m.+ .  
2 .  The utility space U is a compact subset of m.+ .  
3. If a sequence of free disposal allocations { (x� , . . .  , x�)}  satisfies xi+l >,:: i xf for all 
i and all n, then there is an allocation (x1 ,  . . . , Xm) such that Xi >,:: i xf for all i and 
all n .  
Definition 40 An exchange economy is utility closed if its utility space is a closed set 
(or equivalently, if its utility space U satisfies any one of the equivalent statements of 
Lemma 39). 
We emphasize once more that for an exchange economy to have a utility space it is 
necessary that consumer preferences be represented by utility functions. 
Lemma 41  In a Riesz commodity exchange economy, if 
1 .  the Edgeworth box [O, w] is weakly compact, and 
2 .  consumer preferences are represented by monotone continuous utility functions, 
then the economy is utility closed. 
An economy might be utility closed even without the Edgeworth box [O , w] being 
weakly compact. Here is an example. 
Example 42 Consider a two consumer Riesz exchange economy with the following char­
acteristics. 
• Riesz pair: (C[O, 1 ] ,  ca[O, 1 ]) .  
• Total endowment: w = 1 (the constant function one) . 
• Consumer 1 :  Utility function u1 (x) = f0
1 
x (t) dt. 
• Consumer 2: Utility function u2 (x) = f0
1 /X(i) dt. 
You can verify that: 
1 .  Each utility ..funct�n ·is . (sup) Bo rm· eentinuousr'Concave,_�and strictly monotone; 
2 .  The Edgeworth box [O , w] is not weakly compact; and 
3 .  The utility space of the economy is given by 
U = { (  x ,  y) E JR! : x + y2 � 1} .  
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In particular, the economy is utility closed. 0 
The weakly Pareto efficient allocations are closely related with the boundary points 
of the utility space. The next result clarifies the relationship. 
Lemma 43 In a Riesz commodity exchange economy whose consumer preferences are 
represented by monotone continuous utility functions we have the following. 
1 .  If x = (x1 , . . .  , Xm) is a weakly Pareto efficient allocation, then its utility allocation 
vector u (x) = (u1 (x1 ) ,  . . .  , um(xm)) is a boundary point ·ofthe utility space relative 
to R+ {i. e. ,  a boundary point of U considered as a subset of R+). 
2 . If z E U is a boundary point of the utility space relative to R+ , then there exists a 
weakly Pareto efficient allocation (x1 ,  . . .  , xm) such that z = (u1 (x 1 ) ,  . . .  , um(xm)) .  
We now introduce the function p: A -+ [O, oo) via the formula 
p(s) = sup{ a �  0 :  as E U} , 
where as usual A =  { s  E R+ : 2::�1 si = l} .  
Lemma 44 For a Riesz commodity exchange economy, assume preferences are repre­
sentable by monotone and continuous utility functions and that the total endowment is 
desirable for each consumer. Then the function p: A -+ [O , oo) , defined by 
p(s) = sup{ a � 0 :  as E U}, 
is continuous. 
This follows from the Berge Maximum Theorem, see [8 , Theorem 3 .5 .7, p. 157] .  
We can define another function b :  A -+  8U via the formula b(s) = p(s)s .  Note that 
indeed b(s) E 8U for each s E A. The function b is called the boundary (utility) 
function of the economy. From Lemma 44 we see that b is also a continuous function. 
Definition 45 The correspondence B: A -» A, defined by 
B(s) = {x E A :  u(x) � b(s)} ,  
is called the boundary (utility) allocation correspondence. 
For utility closed Riesz commodity exchange economies whose preferences are repre­
sented by monotone continuous utility functions, Lemma 43 shows that for each s E A 
there is an allocation x E Awp such that u(x) = p(s)s .  Thus, in this case, the boundary 
allocation correspondence in nonempty-valued. Actually, much more is true. 
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Lemma 46 For a Riesz commodity exchange economy, assume preferences are repre­
sented by monotone quasiconcave and continuous utility functions, the total endowment 
is desired by each consumer, and that the Edgeworth box [O, w] is weakly compact. Then 
the utility allocation correspondence B: � -»  AwP, defined by 
B(s) = {x E A :  u(x) � b(s)} ,  
has nonempty, convex, and compact values and is continuous (i. e. , upper and lower 
hemicontinuous) . 
Proof : The proof is straightforward. Note that since Awp is Hausdorff and weakly com­
pact (Theorem 7) , the upper hemicontinuity of B is equivalent to B having closed graph [2 , 
Theorem 14.12, p. 465] . I 
1 2  Existence of equilibria 
Corollary 31 asserts that in general, if quasiequilibria exist, then they are weakly Pareto 
efficient. Under appropriate hypotheses, A. Mas-Colell has shown that there do indeed 
exist quasiequilibria. 
Theorem 47 (Mas-Colell [152]) Assume that a Riesz exchange economy satisfies the 
following properties. 
1 .  The preferences of each consumer are represented by a monotone and quasiconcave 
utility function. 
2. There is a consistent locally convex-solid topology r on the commodity space such 
tha� each utility function is continuous. 
3. Each preference is uniformly r-proper. 
4. The total endowment is desirable for each consumer. 
5. The exchange economy is utility closed. 
Then the exchange economy has a quasiequilibrium. 
For a proof see [8, Theorem 3 .5 .12 ,  p. 161] .  
The next important result regarding lattice exchange economies is due to A. Mas­
Colell and S .  F. Richard [154] . 
Theorem 48 (Mas-Colell-Richard [154] )  Assume that in a lattice exchange econ­
omy: 
1 .  Its Edgeworth box [O, w] is weakly compact; and 
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2 .  The preference of each consumer is w-uniformly proper and is represented by a 
monotone, quasiconcave, and continuous utility function. 
Then the economy has a quasiequilibrium. 
Proof : We sketch the basic steps of the Mas-Colell-Richard proof. See [154] for the de­
tails. For each p = (p1 , . . .  , Pm) EE', let 7rp denote the supremum of the set {p1 , . . .  , Pm} ,  
i.e. , 7rp = V:1 Pi E E'. Next we use the nonempty, convex, and weakly compact set K 
guaranteed by Lemma 25. 
Introduce the correspondence <I>: � --++ T = {(t1 , . . .  , tm) E Rm : I::i t i = O} defined 
via the formula 
<I> (s) = { (t1 , . . .  , tm) ET : 3 x E B(s) and p E K(x) such that ti = 7rp (wi-xi) for each i} , 
where B is the correspondence introduced in Definition 45. Since 7r P supports x, it suffices 
to show that 0 E <I> (s) for some s E �. 
This is  established by proving that the correspondence <I> is nonempty, convex, and 
compact valued and also upper hemicontinuous. It then follows that the correspondence 
W: � --++ Rm defined by W ( s) = s + <I> ( s) satisfies the same properties. 
The final argument shows that W is "inward directed" , which guarantees that W has 
a fixed point; see, for instance, [2, Theorem 14.47] . This easily implies that 0 E <I> (s) for 
some s E �' as desired. I 
1 3  The core 
In this section we discuss the core of an economy, the set of allocations that are efficient 
for every subeconomy. This notion was introduced by F. Y. Edgeworth [93] . 
A coalition is a nonempty set of consumers. The coalition { 1 ,  . . .  , m} is called the 
grand coalition. We say that a coalition S blocks (or that it can improve upon) an 
allocation (x1, . . .  , xm) if there exists another allocation (y1 , . . . , Ym) such that 
1 .  LiES Yi = LiES wi, and 
2 .  Yi >- i  X;, for each i £. S. 
In other words, a coalition can improve upon an allocation whenever there is another 
way of redistributing the resources so that every member of the coalition becomes better 
off-regardless of what is happening to the consumers of the complementary coalition. 
Notice that in this terminology an allocation is weakly Pareto efficient if and only if it 
cannot be blocked by the grand coalition. 
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Definition 49 (Edgeworth) A core allocation is an allocation that cannot be blocked 
by any coalition. The core of an economy E is the set of core allocations and is denoted 
Core(£) . 
Here are some well known properties of core allocations. 
Theorem 50 For exchange economies we have: 
1 .  Every core allocation is weakly Pareto efficient and individually rational. 
2. Every Walrasian equilibrium is a core allocation. 
It is easy to see that a core allocation need not be a Walrasian equilibrium. Do core 
allocations exist?  By the above discussion, the answer is, of course, yes. Once we know 
that Walrasian equilibria exist, core allocations also exist. However, it is interesting to 
know that if we can establish the existence of core allocations in a different manner, 
then this can be used to present an alternate way of proving the existence of Walrasian 
equilibria. As we shall see later (Theorem 71) ,  one can establish-in the class of Riesz 
exchange economies with strictly monotone, continuous, convex, and proper preferences 
and strictly positive total endowments-that the following two statements are equivalent. 
1 .  Every economy has a Walrasian equilibrium. 
2 .  Every economy has a core allocation. 
For the time being, we remark that using game theoretic techniques one can establish 
the existence of core allocations independently of the existence of Walrasian equilibria. 
We state this result , which is essentially independently due to 0. N. Bondareva and 
H. E. Scarf. 
Theorem 51 (Bondareva-Scarf [53, 190]) In a Riesz exchange economy assume that: 
1 .  The preferences of each consumer are represented by a monotone and quasiconcave 
utility function. 
2. There exists a consistent locally convex-solid topology on the commodity space E 
such that each utility function is continuous. 
3 .  The Edgeworth box. [O, w] is weakly compact. 
Then the core of the economy is a nonempty weakly compact subset of Em. 
For a proof see [8, Theorem 3.3.6, p. 127] .  
The following example shows that the weak compactness of the Edgeworth box [O, w] 
cannot be dropped from the preceding theorem. 
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Example 52 {Aliprantis-Brown-Burkinshaw [4] ) Consider a two consumer Riesz 
exchange economy with the following characteristics. 
• Riesz pair: (C[O, 1] , ca[O, 1]) . 
• Consumer 1: Initial endowment w1 = 1 (the constant function one) and preference 
given by the utility function 
U1 (x) = t Fx"(i) dt + ! l Fx"(ij dt. 
2 
• Consumer 2: Initial endowment w2 = 1 and preference given by the utility function 
Both utility functions are strictly monotone, strictly concave, norm continuous, and 
norm proper. However, the Edgeworth box [O, w] is not weakly compact. It can be shown 
that this exchange economy has an empty core, see [8, Example 3.3.7, p. 128] .  0 
14 Replication 
Theorems which guarantee that the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations coincides 
with the set of core allocations are known in the economic literature as core equivalence 
theorems . It was conjectured more than one hundred years ago by F .  Y. Edgeworth [93] 
that when the number of consumers in an economy increases, the core of the economy 
"shrinks" to the set of Walrasian equilibria. The purpose of this section is to make precise 
this claim by establishing the core equivalence theorem of G. Debreu and H. E. Scarf [87] . 
To do this, we need to introduce the notion of a replica economy. 
Definition 53 The r-fold replica of an exchange economy £ is a new exchange economy 
Er with the same commodity-price dual pair as £ and mr consumers (indexed by ( i, j) ,  
i = 1 ,  . . .  , m; j = 1 ,  . . .  , r) such that: 
• The preference 'tr ij of consumer ( i, j) is the same as the preference of consumer i, 
i. e. , '?r= ij = 'tr ii and 
• The initial endowment Wij of consumer (i , j) coincides with the initial endowment 
of consumer i, i;e., Wij = w i . 
Notice that the total endowment of the r-fold replica economy is precisely rw. The 
consumers of the form ( i ,  j) for j = 1 ,  . . .  , r are all identical and are referred to as 
consumers of type i .  An allocation 
(xn, 
· · 
·
, X1r , X2i ,  
· 
· 
·
, X2r , 
· 
· ·
, Xmi , 
· · 
·
, Xmr) 
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in an r-fold replica economy has the equal treatment property if Xis = Xit for all i ,  
s ,  and t .  That is, consumers of the same type receive identical bundles. Equal treat­
ment allocations can be identified with allocations in the original economy. Indeed, if 
( x1 , . . .  , Xm) is an allocation of some economy, then by letting Xij = Xi , we can consider 
(xi ,  . . .  , Xm) as an allocation in every r-fold replica economy. 
Lemma 54 In an exchange economy, every Walrasian equilibrium belongs to the core of 
each replica economy. 
Proof : Let (xi , . . .  , xm) be a Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy supported 
by a price p and consider (x1 , . . .  , xm) as an allocation in some r-fold replica. Clearly, 
Xij = Xi E Bi (P) = Bij (P) for all (i, j) . Now note that x 'l-ij Xij = Xi implies p · x > 
p · wi = p · Wij , and the conclusion follows from part (1 ) of Lemma 27. I 
The converse of the preceding result is a reformulation of the celebrated core equiva­
lence theorem of G. Debreu and H. E. Scarf. 
Theorem 55 (Debreu-Scarf [87]) In a finite dimensional exchange economy, if pref­
erences are convex, continuous, and strictly monotone, then an allocation is a Walrasian 
equilibrium if and only if it belongs to the core of every replica economy. 
The next theorem takes care of the existence of allocations that belong to the core of 
every replica economy. In particular, it provides an alternate way of proving the existence 
of Walrasian equilibria in finite dimensional exchange economies. 
Theorem 56 (Debreu-Scarf (87]) Assume that in a Riesz exchange economy: 
1 .  The preferences of each consumer i are represented by a strictly monotone and 
quasiconcave utility function. 
2. There exists a consistent locally convex-solid topology T on the commodity space E 
such that each utility function is continuous. 
3. The Edgeworth box [O, w] is weakly compact. 
Then there is an allocation of E that belongs to the core of every r -fold replica economy 
of E (and hence if the economy is also finite dimensional, it is a Walrasian equilibrium). 
Proof : LeLE be...aRiesz :exchange. economy satisfying. the . hypotheses stated in the the­
orem and let Er denote the r-fold replica economy of E. Let Cr be the set of allocations 
for E that belong to the core of the economy Er , i .e. , 
Clearly, Cr+i c Cr for each r and the intersection n:1 Cr consists precisely of all alloca­
tions for E that belong to the core of every replica economy. If we establish that each 
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Cr is nonempty and weakly closed, then it follows from the finite intersection property 
that the set n�1 Cr is nonempty (by Theorem 7 the set A is weakly compact) and the 
proof of the theorem is finished. The fact that each Cr is a weakly closed set (and in fact 
a weakly compact set) is a matter of a straightforward verification. Next, we prove that 
each Cr is nonempty. 
By Theorem 51 the r-fold economy has a nonempty core. Let 
be a core allocation for the economy Er. We claim that Xij ""'i XiJc for j, k = 1 ,  . . .  , r and 
i = 1 ,  . . .  , m, i .e . ,  we claim that no consumer strictly prefers his bundle to that of another 
consumer of the same type. To see this, we can assume (by rearranging the consumers 
of each type) that Xij >,::i xil for each i and j .  Let 
m 
YiI = � L Xij , i = 1 ,  . . .  , m, 
j=l 
and note that Yil >,::i Xii for all i .  If for some 1 � i � m and some 1 � s � r we have 
Xis >-i Xii , then it follows that Yil >-i xil . Now if each consumer ( i ,  1) gets the bundle 
Yii ,  then the coalition {(i ,  1) : i = 1 ,  . . .  , m} blocks the original allocation (xii ) ,  which 
is a contradiction. To finish the proof note that (yu, y2i, . • .  , Ymi )  is an allocation of the 
economy E satisfying Yil >,::i Xij for all i and j, so (Yn , Y21 ,  . . .  , Ym1) E Cr . 
The parenthetical part follows immediately from Theorem 55. I 
1 5  Edgeworth equilibria 
We saw in the preceding section that in certain finite dimensional exchange economies the 
Walrasian equilibria coincide with the allocations that belong to the core of every replica 
economy. Also, Theorem 56 provides some conditions that guarantee the existence of 
such allocations. Our purpose here is to isolate and study the allocations that belong to 
the core of every replica economy. In general , as we shall see, these allocations need not 
be Walrasian equilibria or even quasiequilibria. 
Definition 57 (Aliprantis-Brown-Burkinshaw [5] ) An allocation in an exchange 
economy is an Edgeworth equilibrium if it belongs to the core of every replication of 
the economy. 
Obviously, every Edgeworth equilibrium is a core allocation (and hence it is indi­
vidually rational and weakly Pareto efficient) . The notion of Edgeworth equilibrium is 
a price free notion in the following sense. If the commodity space X is a Riesz space, 
then all economic activity takes place inside the Edgeworth box [O, w] . So in this case, 
if (xi ,  . . .  , Xm) is an Edgeworth equilibrium, then the allocation (xi , . . .  , xm) remains an 
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Edgeworth equilibrium in any exchange economy whose commodity space is a Riesz sub­
space of X containing the principal ideal Ew (regardless of the nature of the price space 
X') .  
It is clear that every Walrasian equilibrium is automatically an Edgeworth equilib­
rium. As we shall see in the next section, the Edgeworth equilibria are precisely the 
allocations that are Walrasian equilibria with respect to the Riesz pair (Ew, E�) .  The 
fact that a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to a price of E� is an Edgeworth equilib­
rium is easy to prove. We start by stating this result and leave its straightforward proof 
as an exercise. 
Lemma 58 Let (xi , . . .  , Xm) be an allocation in a Riesz commodity exchange economy. 
If there exists a price 0 < p E E� {not necessarily lying in X') such that x >-i Xi in E-;}; 
implies p · x > p · wi, then the allocation (xi , . . .  , Xm) is an Edgeworth equilibrium. 
As an illustration of Lemma 58, we present an example due to L. E. Jones. 
Example 59 (Jones [119] )  Consider an exchange economy with commodity space X = 
Li [O, 1 ] and two consumers with initial endowments wi = w2 = �X[o,i] and preferences 
represented by the utility functions 
Note that both utility functions are strictly monotone and convex (in fact linear) . If 
the functions zi (t) = t and z2(t) = 1 - t belong to X' , then u1 and u2 are also weakly 
continuous. 
Clearl_y, w = 1 and if we put x1 = X( � ,l] and x2 = X[o, �] ' then (x1 , x2) is an allocation. Let p(t) = max{t, 1 - t} .  We claim that x >-i Xi implies p · x > p · Wi · To see this, note 
first that p · xi = p · x2 = p · w1 = p · w2 = � ·  Now if x >-1 x1 , then 
p · x = 11p(t)x(t) dt ;;::: fo\x(t) dt = u1 (x) > u1 (x1) = i\ dt = � = p · W1 . 
2 
Similarly, x >-2 x2 implies p · x > p · w2 .  Hence, (x1 , x2) is a Walrasian equilibrium with 
respect to the price p so by Lemma 58, (x1 , x2) is an Edgeworth equilibrium. In pa.rticular, 
(xi , x2) is also a weakly Pareto efficient (and hence a Pareto efficient) allocation. 
We now show that p is ·{up ·to a constant) the only price that supports the allocation 
(xi , x2) .  To this end, let q be a price supporting (x1 , x2) .  By Lemma 12 ,  we know that 
q is a positive linear functional. This implies that q belongs to the order dual of Li [O , 1] , 
i .e. , 0 < q E L00[0, 1) . 
Next, we claim that q is strictly positive. To see this, let A = { t E [O, �] : q(t) = O} .· 
If A has positive Lebesgue measure, then for some k > 0 we have u1 (kXA) = k JA t dt > 
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ui (xi ) ,  so by the supportability of q, we get 
0 = q · (kXA) � q · X1 = 11 q (t) dt � 0, 
2 
from which it follows that q = 0 a.e. on [! ,  1] . Replacing A by [! , 1] , we see that 
q = 0 a.e. also holds on (0, !J , a contradiction. A similar argument shows that if the set 
{t E [ ! ,  1] : q(t) = O} has positive Lebesgue measure, then q = 0 a.e. So q(t) > 0 for 
almost all t .  
If A is a measurable subset of [� ,  1] of positive Lebesgue measure, then ::((;�))XA >,:: 1 xi . 
Therefore, ui(
(
xi )) JA q(t) dt � f1
1 
q(t) dt, and consequently U1 XA 2 
for each measurable subset A of [ � ,  1 ] .  This implies q(t) � ct for almost all t E [ � ,  1 ] ,  
where c = 
ui (�i ) Jt q(t) dt. We claim that q(t) = ct for almost all t E [! ,  1] .  To see this, assume that {t E [ � ,  1] : q(t) > ct} has positive Lebesgue measure. Then 
li q(t) dt > c 11 t dt = cu1 (x1) = 11 q(t) dt, 
2 2 2 
which is impossible. Hence q(t) = ct for almost all t E [! , l] . Similarly, q(t) = c* (l - t) 
for for almost all t E [O , !J . . 
Next, we show that c = c* . Recall that u1(xi) = u2 (x2) = � · For n � 2 let 
x = � n�iXrt-�.tJ and note that u1 (x) = � · Thus, x ti x1, so support by q implies 
q · x >-: q · x But q · x - � n+I c* and q · x == �c so that � n+I c* >-: �c Letting n -+  oo r 1 · - s n-1 1 8 B n-1 r g · ' 
we get c* ;;::: c. Similarly, if y = � n�iX[t .t+�] ' then u2 (Y) = � and so y t2 X2 . Support 
by q implies q · y = � ��� c ;;::: q · x2 = �c* and by letting n -+ oo, we get c ;;::: c* . Thus, 
c = c* . Consequently, q = cp proving that p is the only price that supports (x1 , x2) .  
If the price space X' does not contain p (for instance, let X' = C1 [0, 1] , the vector 
subspace of L00[0,  1] consisting of all continuously differentiable functions on [O, 1] ) ,  then 
the allocation (x1 , x2) is an Edgeworth equilibrium with respect to (X, X') but not a 
Walrasian equilibrium. D 
The preceding example can be employed to illustrate Theorem 24, which asserts that 
in a lattice exchange economy (with the standard hypotheses) every weakly efficient 
allocation can be supported by prices. Since a linear preference (i.e . ,  a preference that 
is represented by a utility function of the form u(x) = p · x for some linear functional p 
on E) is proper if and only if it is continuous, we see that in the setting of the preceding 
example ,  the hypotheses of Theorem 24 guarantee that the linear functionals represented 
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by the functions t and 1 - t must lie in X'. In particular, if the price space X' is a 
Riesz subspace of the order dual L00[0, 1] of L1 [0, 1] , then X' must contain the Riesz 
subspace generated by 1 and t (which coincides with the vector space of all continuous 
piecewise linear functions) . Therefore, if the hypotheses of Theorem 24 are satisfied , then 
X' contains all the continuous piecewise linear functions. 
The next example illustrates the fact that Edgeworth equilibria need not be supported 
by prices in the given price space. 
Example 60 Consider a two consumer exchange economy with two identical consumers; 
each has an initial endowment w > 0 and a convex preference >;:: defined on a common 
convex consumption set. Then, we claim that the allocation (w, w) is an Edgeworth 
equilibrium. To see this, assume in some n-fold replica economy there exist an allocation 
{xii : i = 1 ,  . . .  , m; j = 1 ,  . . .  , n} and a coalition S such that 
1 .  L(i,j)ES 
Xij = kw (where k is the number of consumers in S) ; and 
2 .  Xij >- w for each (i, j) E S. 
Hence, if (i0 , j0) E S  satisfies Xij >;:: Xioio for each (i , j) E S, then by the convexity of >;:: , 
we see that 
W = � L Xij >;:: Xiojo >- w, 
(i,j)ES 
which is impossible. Therefore, (w, w) is an Edgeworth equilibrium. However, such an 
equilibrium need not be supported by any price in X'; see Examples 15 and 35. D 
With any allocation (x1 ,  . . .  , xm) we define the two nonempty sets 
If the preferences are convex, then the Fi and Gi are all convex sets, so the convex hull 
G of the union of the Gi is given by 
m m m 
G = co 
(LJ ci) = {L Aigi :  gi E Gi , Ai � 0 for each i ,  and L Ai = 1 }. 
i=l i=l i=l 
When the allocation is an Edgeworth equilibrium the convex set G satisfies an im­
portant appmxirruition ,Property. -This approximation -property is the key property in 
establishing several "core equivalence" type theorems. 
Lemma 61 2 Consider a Riesz exchange economy such that: 
2This lemma was first proved by B. Peleg and M. Yaari [177] for a special case. In its present form the 
lemma was established by C. D. Aliprantis , D. J. Brown and 0. Burkinshaw [5] . Its proof demonstrates 
the importance and usefulness of the Riesz space structures. 
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1 .  Preferences are convex and weakly upper semicontinuous. 
2. The Edgeworth box [O, w] is weakly compact. 
3. The total endowment w is desirable for each consumer. 
If (xi , . . . , Xm) is an Edgeworth equilibrium, then for each c > :0 we have 0 rt cw + G 
(where the bar denotes weak closure). 
Proof : Let (E, E') denote the Riesz pair of the exchange economy. Fix an Edgeworth 
equilibrium (x 1 ,  . . .  , Xm) and let c > 0. Also, assume by way of contradiction that 
0 E cw + G or -cw E G. 
Let r denote the absolute weak topology on E, i .e. , let r = l a l (E, E') .  Since G is 
convex and r is a consistent topology on E, it follows that the weak and r closures of G 
coincide. Hence, there exists a net {ga} in G such that 9a 2+ -cw. 
For each a choose gf E Gi, Af � 0 (i = 1 ,  . . .  , m) with I:;:1 Af = 1 and 9a = 
I:;:1 Afgf . By passing to a subnet, we can assume that Af --+ Ai � 0 for each i .  From 
I::,1 Ai = 1 ,  we see that the set S = { n E {1 ,  . . .  , m} : An > O} is nonempty. By passing 
to a subnet again, we can assume that there exists some o > 0 such that A� � � for all 
n E S and all a. 
Next, for each i write gf = ft - wi . We claim that for each n E S the net {f�} has 
a weakly convergent subnet in E. To this end, fix n E S. Then 
m m m m 
0 � A�f;: � L Af ft = L Af (gf + wi) = L Af gf + L Afwi 
and consequently 
i=l i=l i=l 
m 
9a + L Af Wi � 9a + W � (ga + cW) + W, 
i=l 
0 � f:: � ;a (ga + cw) + ;aw � o(ga + cw) + ow . 
n n 
i=l 
Since [O , ow] = o[O, w] is (by our hypothesis) a weakly compact order interval Cl,nd 9a + 
cw 2+ 0, it follows that {f�} has a weakly convergent subnet. So by passing to an 
appropriate subnet, we can _assume _that f� .:!/?In in_E for £ach n E S. By the weak 
upper semi continuity of preferences each Fn is weakly closed, so f n E Fn (i .e . ,  f n >,:::n Xn) 
for each n E S. From 
m m 
9a = L Af (ft - Wi) � L A�f;: - L A�Wn � L Anfn - L AnWn 
i=l nES i=l nES nES 
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and the fact that E+ is weakly closed, we see that 
Rearranging, we get 
-EW = w- li;n ga � L >.nf n - L AnWn · 
nES nES 
L >.nUn + cw) :::; L AnWn · 
nES nES 
By the desirability of w, we have fn + EW >-n fn >rn Xn for each n E S. Finally, using 
(*) an easy argument shows that (xi , . . .  , xm) can be blocked in some replica economy, 
which is a contradiction. The proof of the lemma is now complete. I 
1 6  Edgeworth equilibria and quasiequilibria 
Here we relate the Edgeworth equilibria to Walrasian equilibria and quasiequilibria. The 
results in this section are due to C. D .  Aliprantis, D. J. Brown and 0. Burkinshaw [5) . 
We start by introducing the notion of an approximate quasiequilibrium. 
Definition 62 An allocation (xi , . . .  , Xm) in an exchange economy is an approximate 
quasiequilibrium if for each c > 0 there exists some nonzero price p E X' (depending 
upon c) such that 
1 .  p · w = 1; and 
2 .  x >?i Xi implies p · x � p · Wi - E. 
In a Riesz commodity exchange economy with at least one consumer having a mono­
tone preference, say the first one, every price p that satisfies properties (1) and (2) of the 
above definition is necessarily a positive price. Indeed, if x � 0, then xi + c>-ix >ri xi for 
each o > 0 .  Hence, p · xi + c>-ip · x � p · wi - c or p ·  x � c5(p · wi - p · xi - c) for each 
c5 > 0 from which it follows that p · x � 0. 
Lemma 63 Consider a Riesz exchange economy such that: 
1 .  Preferences are convex and weakly upper semicontinuous. 
2 .  The Edgewo.dh JJa.i .'[O., w) .is .weakly . compact. 
3. The total endowment w is desirable for each consumer. 
Then every Edgeworth equilibrium is an approximate quasiequilibrium. 
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Proof : Consider an exchange economy satisfying the hypotheses, let (x1 , • . •  , Xm) be an 
Edgeworth equilibrium, and let c > 0. By Lemma 61, we know that 0 fl. cw + G, where 
m m m 
G = co 
(LJ ai) = {L .Aigi :  gi E Gi , Ai � 0 for each i ,  and L Ai = 1 }, 
i=l i=l i=l 
and Gi = {x E X : x + wi >,::i xi} · So by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem [2, 
Theorem 4.54, p. 147) ,  there exists some price p E E' satisfying 
p · (g + cw) > 0 for all g E G. 
Clearly p · w > 0. Indeed, Xi - wi E Gi, so 0 = L:�1 ;k(xi - wi) E G, and thus 
p · W = �p · (0 + cW) > 0. 
Replacing p by f,w, we can assume p · w = 1 . If x >,::i xi , then x - wi E G, so 
p · (x - Wi + cw) > 0 ,  from which it follows that p · x � p · wi - c, as desired. I 
The approximate quasiequilibria are Walrasian equilibria for a subeconomy of the 
original economy. 
Lemma 64 If (x1 ,  . . .  , Xm) is an approximate quasiequilibrium for a Riesz exchange 
economy, then there exists a positive linear functional p on Ew (the ideal generated by 
the total endowment w) such that: 
1 .  p · w = 1 ;  and 
2 .  x >t::i Xi in Et implies p · x � p · wi . 
That is, every approximate quasiequilibrium is a quasiequilibrium with respect to another 
Riesz economy whose consumer characteristics are the same as the original ones and with 
Riesz pair (Ew ,  E�) .  
Proof : Let ( x1 , . . .  , Xm) be an approximate quasiequilibrium for a Riesz exchange econ­
omy. For each natural number n choose some 0 ::::;; Pn E E' with Pn · w = 1 and such 
that 
implies Pn · x � Pn · Wi - � .  
Now consider each Pn restricted to Ew· The condition Pn · w = 1 implies that Pn as a 
functional "'6n th�-nermed"8pace { £w ·; �HJ 00} �has_norm one� ::So :by the Alaoglu Compactness 
Theorem [2 , Theorem 4.79] , the sequence {Pn} has a w*-accumulation point, say p. Then, 
p is a positive functional on Ew (although it need not be defined on all of E) , p · w = 1 ,  
and x >t::i Xi in Et implies p · x � p · wi . I 
And now we come to an important result that describes the relationships between the 
various equilibria notions introduced before. 
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Theorem 65 (Aliprantis-Brown-Burkinshaw [5] ) Consider a Riesz exchange econ­
omy with Riesz pair (E, E') such that: 
a. Preferences are convex, continuous for some consistent locally convex-solid topology 
on E, and monotone on E'� . 
b. The Edgeworth box [O, w] is weakly compact. 
c. The total endowment w is desirable for each consumer. 
Then for .  an allocation the following statements are equivalent. 
1 .  The allocation is an Edgeworth equilibrium. 
2. The allocation is an approximate quasiequilibrium. 
3. The allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium for the Riesz exchange economy with the 
same preferences and endowments and Riesz pair (Ew, E�) .  
Proof : Consider an exchange economy that satisfies the properties stated in the theorem 
and let (xi ,  . . .  , Xm) be an allocation. 
(1) ====> (2) This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 63. 
(2) ====> (3) By Lemma 64 the allocation (x1 , . . .  , xm) is a quasiequilibrium with 
respect to the Riesz pair (Ew,  E�) .  Since preferences are strictly monotone on E"J, it 
follows from Corollary 32 that (xi ,  . . .  , Xm) is a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to 
(Ew, E�) . 
(3) ===?- (1) This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 58. I 
The next example illustrates the preceding theorem. 
Example 66 Consider once more the Riesz exchange economy introduced in Exam­
ple 15 .  In Example 35, we established that (w1 , w2) was a Walrasian equilibrium with 
respect to the Riesz pair (Ew,  E�) (but not a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to 
the original Riesz pair (£1 , £00) ) . So according to Theorem 65, (w1 , w2) is an Edgeworth 
equilibrium or, equivalently, an approximate quasiequilibrium. We now demonstrate the 
existence of the prices that support (wi , w2) as an approximate quasiequilibrium. So let 
c > 0. 
Fix some k such that L::=k 2� < � and consider the £00-price q = (2, 2
2 , • • •  , 2k , 1 ,  1 ,  1 ,  . . .  ) . 
Then q satisfies the following properties. 
40 
To see this, note that 
00 k 00 
u (w1) = L 2n�l ;::: L 2n�l + L 22!+1 = q . W1 . 
n=l n=l n=k+l 
• q · x ;::: u(x) - � for each 0 � x E £1 . 
We proved in Example 35 that 2nt ;::: 'Pn(t) for each t ;::: 0. Moreover, from the 
definition of 'Pn, we see that t + 2� ;::: 'Pn(t) for all t ;::: 0. So if x = (xi , x2, • • •  ) E .et , then 
k 00 k 00 00 
q · X L 2
nXn + L Xn = L 2nXn + L (xn + 2� )  - L 2� 
n=l n=k+l n=l n=k+l n=k+l 
k 00 
;::: L 'Pn(xn) + L 'Pn(xn) - � = u(x) - � ·  
n=l n=k+l 
Indeed, if x >,:: 1 w1 , then from the preceding two properties we see that 
• If p = -f!w E E�, then p · w = 1 and x >,::: 1 w1 implies p · x ;::: p · w1 - £. 
Clearly, p · w = 1 ,  where w = w1 + w2 = ( 2\ ,  �' • • •  , 2in , • • •  ) , and q · w > � · Now if 
x >,::: 1 wi , then from the last property we get 
P • X = !l.:!l. :>,; q·w1 - _e_ >-: p . W1 - c. q ·w r q ·w 2q·w r 
Therefore, the price p is "£-supporting" the Edgeworth equilibrium (wi , w2) .  D 
Note that statements (1) and (3) of Theorem 65 remain equivalent without the as­
sumption that the Edgeworth box [O, w] is weakly compact. Specifically, we have the 
following companion result to Theorem 65. 
Theorem 67 (Aliprantis-Brown-Burkinshaw [5] ) In a Riesz exchange economy, 
suppose that preferences are convex, continuous for some consistent linear topology on 
E, and strictly monotone. on E-;};. Then the following statements about an allocation are 
equivalent. 
1 .  The allocation is an Edgeworth equilibrium. 
2. The allocation is an approximate quasiequilibrium with respect to the Riesz pair 
(Ew ,  E�) .  
3 .  The allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to the Riesz pair (Ew , E�) .  
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For a proof see [8, Theorem 3.4. 18, p. 145) . 
We close the section by establishing an important equilibrium existence result of T. F. 
Bewley(46 ,  47) . Consider the Riesz pair (L00, Li) ,  where L00 = L00(µ) and Li = Li (µ) for 
some O"-finite measure µ. We know that (L00, Li) is a symmetric Riesz pair and that the 
Mackey topology r(Lrx)) Li) is locally solid and order continuous; see Theorem [2, Theo­
rem 7.32) . Moreover, by [2 , Theorem 7.30) , we also know that the only order continuous 
prices on L00 are the prices in Li . 
Theorem 68 (Bewley (47]) Consider a Riesz exchange economy having Riesz pair 
(L00 , Li) and whose preferences are represented by strictly monotone, quasiconcave, and 
Mackey continuous utility functions. 
If the total endowment w is bounded away from zero (i. e. ,  if there exists some c: > 0 
such that w(x) � c: for µ-almost all x), then the economy has a Walrasian equilibrium. 
Proof : Start by observing that since w is bounded away from zero, we have Ew = L00• 
Now, by Theorem 56, the economy has an Edgeworth equilibrium which, by Theorem 65, 
it is supported as a Walrasian equilibrium by a price 0 < p E E� = L'oo . Since the order 
interval (0, w] is weakly (i.e. D"(L00, Li)-)compact, it follows from Theorem 34(2) that p 
is order continuous on L00 , and thus p E Li . Therefore, the economy has a Walrasian 
equilibrium. I 
We close the section by mentioning that approximate equilibria in connection with 
the welfare theorems have been studied by C. D .  Aliprantis and 0. Burkinshaw (12) , 
R. A. Becker, H. Bercovici, and C.  Foias [39) , and M. A.  Khan and R. Vohra [128) . 
1 7  Edgeworth equilibria and properness 
In the previous sections, we saw that an Edgeworth equilibrium need not be a quasiequi­
librium. However, if the economy has uniformly proper preferences, then every Edgeworth 
equilibrium is a quasiequilibrium. This is the basic result of this section. 
Theorem 69 (Aliprantis-Brown-Burkinshaw [5] ) Consider a Riesz exchange econ­
omy such that each preference is monotone, convex, and uniformly proper for a consistent 
locally convex-solid topology r on the commodity space. Then every Edgeworth equilibrium 
is a quasiequilibrium {with respect to the Riesz pair (E, E')). 
Proof : Consider a Riesz exchange economy having the properties stated in the theorem 
and let (xi ,  . . .  , Xm) be an Edgeworth equilibrium. As before, define 
� = { x E E+ : x >?=i xi} and G i = � - Wi = { x E E : x + Wi >?=i Xi} ,  
and let G = co (LJ�i Gi) ·  
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Since each preference is uniformly 7-proper, for each i there exist a convex, solid , 
open 7-neighborhood Vi of zero and some vi > 0 such that x - cwi + z >,::i x  in E+ with 
a > 0 imply z ¢ a\'i. Put v = n::1 Vi and v = r:::1 Vi , and define the nonempty, 
convex and 7-open cone r of E by 
r = {aw : a > 0 and w E E satisfies w + v E ! V}. 
We claim that r n G = 0. If this is the case, then by the Separating Hyperplane 
Theorem [2, Theorem 4.46, p. 143] there exists some nonzero price p E E' satisfying 
p · g ):  p · / for all g E G and all 1 E r. Since / E r implies et/ E r for all a >  0, we see 
that p·g ): 0 for each g E G. Now, if x >,::i Xi , then x-wi E G, so p· (x-wi) = p·x-p·Wi ): 0 
implies p · x ): p · wi . This means that (x1 , . . .  , xm) is a quasiequilibrium for our exchange 
economy. 
To finish the proof, we must establish that r n G = 0. To this end, assume by way 
of contradiction that r n G # 0. Fix a E r n G and write 
m 
a =  L Ai (zi - wi) = aw, 
i=l 
where Ai ): 0 and Zi >,::i Xi for each i, r:::1 Ai = 1 , a >  0, and w E E  satisfies w+v E !V. 
For each i pick a sequence {r�} of strictly positive rational numbers such that r� ..k Ai · 
So there exist positive rational numbers 1;f- (with the ni and n positive integers) such 
that 
Consequently, 
Next, put 
m 
[� L 1;!-(zi - wi) - w] + (w + v) E !V + !V = V. 
i=l 
m m 
L nizi - L niwi + anv E anV. 
i=l i=l 
m 
y = _L niwi - anv and 
i=l 
m 
Z = _L niZi ): 0. 
i=l 
From z - y = z + anv - I:::1 niwi ::;; z + anv, it follows that 
m 
(y - z)-:- = (z - y)+ ::;; z + anv = _L(niZi + anvi) · 
i=l 
From the Riesz Decomposition Property, there exist positive vectors Wi E E+ (i 
1, . . .  , m) with 0 ::;; Wi ::;; nizi + an vi and r:::1 wi = (y - z )- . Define 
Y . = z· + 
anv · - ..1.w. = ..1.(n ·z · + anv · - w·) � 0 i i n; i n; i n; i i i i :;;-- ' 
and note that Yi >-i Zi for each i .  Indeed, if Zi = Yi - �7vi + �; Wi >,::i Yi is true, 
then the properness implies ;; Wi ¢ �;v, or Wi ¢ anV. On the other hand, from 
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0 � wi � (y - z)- � IY - zl = i:z::::,1 ni (Zi - wi) + anvl and (*) , we see that wi E anV, 
which contradicts Wi rj. anV. So Yi >-i Zi for all i .  Finally, from Yi >-i Zi >r=i Xi and 
m m m 
L nizi + an L Vi - L Wi = z + anv - (y - z )-
i=I . i=l i=l 
m 
� z + anv + y - z = y + anv = l: niwi , 
i=l 
it follows that the allocation (x1 , . . .  , xm) can be blocked in some replica economy, which 
is impossible. Hence, r n G = 0 must be true, as desired. I 
Now the infinite dimensional analogue of the Debreu-Scarf Core Equivalence Theo­
rem 55 can be formulated as follows. 
Theorem 70 In a convex Riesz exchange economy whose preferences are strictly mono­
tone, continuous, and uniformly proper for a consistent locally convex-solid topology and 
the total endowment is strictly positive, the sets of Walrasian and Edgeworth equilibria 
coincide. 
Proof : Clearly, every Walrasian equilibrium is an Edgeworth equilibrium. On the other 
hand, any Edgeworth equilibrium in such an exchange economy is (by Theorem 69) a 
quasiequilibrium which in turn (by Corollary 32) must be a Walrasian equilibrium. I 
Theorem 71 In the class of convex Riesz exchange economies with strictly positive total 
endowments, weakly compact Edgeworth boxes, and strictly monotone, continuous, and 
uniformly proper (for consistent locally convex-solid topologies) preferences, the fallowing 
statements are equivalent. 
1 .  Every economy has a Walrasian equilibrium. 
2 .  Every economy has a core allocation. 
Proof : To see that (2) implies (1) ,  notice that a verbatim repetition of the proof of 
Theorem 56 guarantees the existence of an allocation that belongs to the core of every 
replica economy, which, by Theorem 55, must be a Walrasian equilibrium. I 
It is also interesting to mention the following converse-type result of Theorem 24. If 
(under the standard hypotheses) in a Riesz commodity exchange economy every Edge­
worth equilibrium is supported by a price as a quasiequilibrium, then the price space X' 
is necessarily a Riesz subspace of the order dual E"' of E. For details see [14) . .. 
1 8  The single sector growth model 
The standard formulation of the single sector optimal growth problem runs something 
like this.3 There is a single commodity which is used as capital, along with labor, to 
3For more details of the standard formulation see, e.g. , M. Harris [110, Chapters 2 and 3] or N. Stokey, 
R. Lucas, and E. Prescott (205, Chapter 5) . 
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produce more output. In the simplest formulation, labor is presumed to be supplied in 
fixed amounts and capital and consumption are interpreted in per capita terms. Raw 
output is either consumed or saved as capital until the next period. This process repeats 
ad infinitum. 
Letting ct denote the quantity of output consumed at time t and kt denote the capital 
stock, where k1 is given as a datum, the set of feasible trajectories of the economy is the 
set of all positive sequences 
obeying 
kt+l = ( 1  - o)kt + J(kt) - ct and 0 ::; ct ::; J(kt) 
for t =  1, 2, . . . . Here f:  [O , oo) --+ [O, oo) is the production function and 0 < 8 < 1 is 
the rate of physical depreciation of capital. The production function f is assumed to 
be continuous, strictly concave, strictly increasing, and to satisfy f(O) = 0, f' (O) = oo ,  
and limk�oo I�) = 0.  The functions f(k) = kP, where 0 < .p < 1 ,  are all acceptable 
production functions. 
Lemma 72 If f is a production function, then for each m > 0 there exists a unique 
km > 0 such that: 
1 .  J(km) = mkm; 
2. J (k) > mk for each 0 < k < km; and 
3. J(k) < mk for each k > km · 
Now we come to the notion of a free disposal trajectory. 
Definition 73 The set of free disposal feasible trajectories with respect to a pro­
duction function f' some ki > 0, and some 0 < 8 < 1 is the set y c et x et de.fined 
by 
Y = { ( k) ( o+ )2 . 0 ::; kt+l ::; (1 - o)kt + f (kt) - ct t = 1 2 } c, E t.00 • 0 ::; ct ::; f (kt) ' ' ' . . . . 
Let 1 denote the constant sequence one in e00 x e00, i .e . ,  1 = ( ( 1 ,  1 ) ,  (1 ,  1 ) , . ·; .) . 
Lemma 7 4 _Every feasible f:cee disposal .set ·-Of ,trajectories Y is a convex norm bounded 
subset of et x et and satisfies 0 E Y and 771 E Y for some 17 > 0 .  
Proof : Let Y be a free disposal feasible set of trajectories with respect to a production 
function f and some k1 > 0. Clearly, Y is a convex set. Next, we establish that Y is 
norm bounded. To this end, let (c, k) E Y. Since limk�oo I�) = 0, there exists n such 
that f(k) < ok for each k ;;?: n. Put M = supkE[O,oo) [f(k) - ok] = maxkE[O,nJ [f(k) - ok] 
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and let b = max{n + M, k1 } < oo. We claim that kt � b for each t .  The proof is by 
induction. For t =  1 ,  the inequality is obvious. Now for the induction step, assume that 
kt � b. If kt > n ,  then 
kt+i = (1 - o)kt + f (kt) - Ct = kt + [!(kt) - okt] - Ct < kt � b. 
If kt � n,  then 
kt+1 = kt + [!(kt) - okt] - Ct � n + M � b ,  
and the proof of our claim is complete. To see that the sequence {Ct} is uniformly 
bounded, note that 
0 � Ct �  f (kt) � max f(k) O�k�b 
for each t .  Finally, note that 0 E Y and if f (TJ) = (1 + o)TJ, then T]l E Y. I 
It is also easy to see that since Y is defined pointwise by inequalities among continuous 
functions, that Y is pointwise closed. In particular, Y is closed for the a(.e00 x .e00 , .e1 x .e1 )­
topology. This leads to the next lemma. 
Lemma 75 Every set of feasible free disposal trajectories Y is a(.e00 x .e00, .e1 x .e1 ) ­
compact. 
Proof : Recall that the norm dual of .e1 is the Banach lattice .e00• Since Y is norm bounded 
and a(.e00 x .e00, .e1 x .e1)-closed, Alaoglu's Theorem [2 , Theorem 4 .79 , p.158] shows that 
Y is a (.e00 X .e00, .e1 X .e1)-compact. I 
The purpose of the optimal growth problem is to find the feasible plan ( c, k) maxi­
mizing the objective function 
00 
U(c, k) = I: (3tu(Ct) ,  
t=l 
where u :. [O , oo) -+ R is continuous, concave, strictly increasing, and normalized so that 
u (O) = 0 and 0 < (3 < 1 is a constant called the discount factor. Note that in case { Xt} is 
bounded so is {u(xt) } ,  so :z:::: 1 (3tu (xt) is a real number. Therefore, U: .e-:O x .eti -+ R is 
a well defined function. The objective function U may be interpreted either as the social 
welfare function of a central planner or as the utility function of a representative agent 
in the economy who has complete control of his/her own consumption and production. 
Since Y is a(.e00 x .e00, .e1 x .e1 )-compact an optimal plan is guaranteed to exist if U is 
a (.e00 x .e00, .e1 x .e1 )-upper semicontinuous; see Theorem [2, Theorem 2 .43] . Indeed, as we 
shall see, U is a(.e00 x .e00, .e1 x .e1 )-continuous on the free disposal feasible trajectory sets. 
Any free disposal trajectory that maximizes U over a free. disposal feasible trajectory set 
Y is known as an optimal plan. 
Lemma 76 If Y is a free disposal feasible trajectory set, then every optimal plan ( c, k) 
is a feasible trajectory, i. e. , 
for each t .  
kt+I = (1 - O)kt + f (kt) - Ct and 0 � Ct � f (kt) 
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We next note the following properties of the utility function. 
Lemma 77 For a concave nondecreasing function u: [O, oo) -t [O, oo) satisfying u(O) = 0 
the following statements hold. 
1 .  If 0 < x ::;;; y, then u�) ::;;; u�) . 
2 .  If x > 0 and y ;:: 0, then 
ju(x) - u(y) j. � �Ix - Y I · 
3. If 0 � x ::;;; z ::;;; y and z > 0, then 
lu(x) - u(y) I ::;;; � Ix - Y I · 
Let u: [O, oo) -t [O, oo) be a nondecreasing utility function. Then the discounted utility 
of u with respect to 0 < /3 < 1 is the function U: .et -t [O, oo) .defined by 
00 
U(x) = L f3tu(xt) · 
t=l 
Theorem 78 Let u: [O, oo) -t JR be a nondecreasing concave function satisfying u(O) = 0 
and let U be the discounted utility of u with respect to some 0 < /3 < 1 .  Then: 
1 .  U is nondecreasing, concave, and la l (f00, f1) -continuous; 
2 .  U · is a(f00, f1) -continuous on the norm bounded subsets of f't,; and 
3. U is norm continuous. 
Proof : (1) To show that U is la l (f00, £1 )-continuous, let xa lul (loo,£1 ) > x in .et. We wish 
to show that IU(xa) - U(x) I a+ 0. To this end, let £ >  0. 
Choose 'T/ > 0 such that L,:1 /3tu('TJ) < £ and let BTJ 
L,:1 /3tu(xt) < oo , we see that (/31u(x1), /32u(x2), /33u(x3), ... ) 
(since xa lul(l;,£1 ) > 0) some a0 such that 
00 00 
{t : Xt < 'TJ}. From 
E f 1. So there exists 
L /3tu(;t) jxf - Xt l < £ and L /3tu�TJ) l xf - Xt l < £ 
t=l t=l 
for all a ;:: ao . 
Now let t E BTJ. If xf > 'TJ, then ju(xf) - u(xt) I � u�TJ) jxf - Xt l (Lemma 77) , and if 
xf < 'TJ, then lu(xf) - u(xt) I ::;;; 2u('TJ) . Thus, 
L /3t lu(xt) - u(xt) I � L /3t�lxf - Xt l + 2 L /3tu('TJ) < £ + 2£ = 3£. 
�� �� . �� 
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Finally, using Lemma 77 once more, we see that 
00 00 00 
IU(xa) - U(x) I = /L ,etu(xf) - L,Btu(xt) I � L ,Btlu(xf) - u(xt) I  
t=l t=l t=l 
for all a � a0 , as desired. 
L ,Bt lu(xf) - u(xt) I  + L ,Bt lu(xf) - u(xt) I  
tEB,, 
< 3c- + c- = 4c-. 
tEBij 
(2) Assume xa cr(foo ,fl) x and that l 1x l 100 � b < oo and l l xa l loo � b for each a. Fix 
c > 0 and then choose some n such that 2 I:�n+l ,Btu(b) < €. Thus, 
n 
IU(xa) - U(x) I � L ,Bt lu(xf) - u(xt) I + €. 
t=l 
Taking into account that xa cr(foo,fl ) x implies xf a+ Xt for each t, the preceding inequality 
yields lim supa IU(xa) - U(x) I  � € for each € >  O. Therefore, U(xa) a+ U(x) . 
( 3) This follows from the fact that every norm convergent sequence is norm bounded 
and weakly convergent. I 
Before proceeding further, let us introduce the notion of a single agent growth econ­
omy. The single agent growth model economy has the following characteristics. 
1 .  The commodity-price duality (E, E') is the symmetric Riesz pair (f00 x f00 , f1 x f1 ) .  
2 .  The production possibility set is a set Y c E+ which is convex, weakly compact, 
and satisfies 0 E Y and 771 E Y for some 77 > 0. 
3. There is a single agent who in his/her capacity as the manager of production 
chooses output to maximize the value of output treating prices parametrically. 
As a consumer the agent maximizes a preference relation );::: defined on E+ subject 
to a b11dget constraint, �treating-prices and income as parameters. The preference 
);::: is assumed to be strictly monotone, convex, and 7-continuous for a consistent 
locally convex linear topology T on E. 
We have already seen that the standard formulation of the single sector growth model 
with discounted utility fits this framework. 
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Definition 79 A competitive equilibrium for a single agent growth economy is a 
pair (x, p) in E x  E' such that: 
1 .  x E Y and p =/= 0; 
2 .  the bundle x maximizes the value of output at prices p, i. e . ,  p · x � p · y for all 
y E Y; and 
3. the bundle x also maximizes the preference >;:: subject to the budget constraint. That 
is, letting B = { z E E+ : p · z � p · x}, then x >;:: z for all z E B. 
The next result is closely related to results obtained by R .  E .  Lucas and E .  Prescott [137, 
179) and A. Araujo and P. Monteiro [24) . 
Theorem 80 Every single agent growth economy has a competitive equilibrium. 
Proof : Since Y is a(E, E')-compact and >;:: is T-continuous there is a >;::-greatest element 
x of Y; see [8, Theorem 1 .2 .2 , p. 14) .  
By Theorem 19 ,  we know that >;:: is norm proper. Thus, >;:: is (v, W)-uniformly proper 
for some norm open ball W centered at the origin. Therefore, v is a desirable bundle. 
Consider the cone 
r = {a(-v + w) : a >  0 and w E W}. 
Since -v E I'  and -v + W � I', we see that I' has a (norm) nonempty interior. Now if 
F is the preferred set of x, i .e . , if F = {z : z >;:: x} , then we claim that (F - Y) n I' =  0. 
To see this, assume by way of contradiction that (F - Y) n r =/= 0. Then there exist 
a >  0, z E F, y E Y, and w E W satisfying 
z - y = a(-v + w) . 
Then z = y-av+aw, z >;:: x, and x >;:: y since x is maximal in Y. Thus y-av+aw = z >;:: x 
and x >;:: y .  Therefore, we have y - av + aw >;:: y, and by properness aw ¢:. aW, a 
contradiction. Thus, (F - Y) n r = 0, as claimed. 
Next, by the Separation Theorem [2, Theorem 4.46, p. 143) there exist a non-zero 
price q in the norm dual of E (which may not lie in E') and some constant c such that 
q · (z - y) � c � q · g 
for all z - y E F .:...;. Y and all g E r. SinceT is a cone, we see that c � 0. Also x E Y, so 
if z >;:: x then z - x E F - Y, so q · z � q · x. Moreover, x - y E F - Y, so q · x � q · y for 
all y E Y. 
Since for each z � 0, we have (x + z) - x E F - Y, we see that q · (x + z) � q · x, 
or q · z � 0. Therefore, q > 0. In particular, q · 1 > 0 .  Since ryl E Y, this shows that 
q · X > 0.  
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By the Yosida-Hewitt representation [2, p. 250] , we can write q = p + s, where 
0 :::;; p E £1 x £1 , s � 0 and s · z = 0 for all z E Co x Co·  To finish the proof, we show that 
(x, p) is an equilibrium (cf. [179] ) .  
Pick a sequence { Xn} E c0 x Co such that 0 :::;; Xn t x and note that X n  2+ x. Fix c > 0 .  
From x + EV >- x ,  we see that there exists some no such that X n  + EV >- x for all n � n0 • 
So q · (xn + cv) = q · Xn + cq · v � q · x for all n � no . Thus, 0 :::;; q · (x - Xn) :::;; cq · v for 
all n � n0 , which means that lim q · Xn = q · x. Since p is also o-(E, E')-continuous and 
q · Xn = p · Xn + s · Xn = p · Xn , we see that p · x = q · x.  In particular, note that p -::j:. 0 .  
Now we are ready to show that (x , p) is an equilibrium. Let y E Y. Then y � 0 and 
q � p, so p ·  x = q · x � q · y � p · y. Next, let z >- x. It easily follows that there exists 
some 0 :::;; z0 :::;; z such that z0 >- x and z0 E Co x eo .  Choose some 0 < 8 < 1 such that 
8zo >- x. Then p ·  (8z0) = (p + s) · (8z0) = q · (8zo) � q · x  = p · x  > 0. Since p � 0 and 
z � z0 , we get p · z � 8p · z � 8p · z0 � p · x > O, which shows that p · z > p · x. In other 
words, x is the maximal element in the budget set, and the proof is finished. I 
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